In recent years, moral psychologists have attempted to answer two big questions: What are the respective roles of intuition and reasoning in moral judgment? Are moral judgments made by a dedicated moral faculty, or by one or more domain-general processes? The dual-process theory of moral judgment, now a decade old, is an answer to the first question. I’ll provide an overview and update on the evidence supporting it. The dual-process theory, by explaining moral judgment in terms of competing processes, provides a framework within which one can examine a range of influences on moral judgment. I’ll describe experiments implicating the respective influences of explicit reasoning, cognitive control, visual imagery, action representations, and domain-general valuation mechanisms. These results indicate that moral judgment is not, in general, the product of a dedicated moral faculty. Rather, moral judgments are the integrative products of diverse cognitive systems that are neither specifically dedicated to, nor designed for, moral judgment. I’ll consider some of the potential normative implications of this view of the moral brain.