

The Personal Dative in Appalachian English as a Reflexive Pronoun

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Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the Personal Dative construction found in Appalachian English and Southern American English. In this construction, a pronoun is permitted to be coreferential with a local antecedent. We argue that the pronouns in the Personal Dative construction are a type of anaphor, despite their phonological similarity to full pronouns. We analyze the Personal Dative in light of the approach to SE anaphors taken by Reuland (2001), suggesting these are bound pronouns that do not take a theta role. This work suggests that the Personal Dative construction is not unique, but is another instance of a phenomenon found cross-linguistically.

Introduction

The Personal Dative construction is attested to in Southern American English and Appalachian English (Wolfram and Christian, 1976), and is shown in (1).

- (1) I got me some sandwiches

The construction in (1) has recently been analyzed as an idiom (Webelhuth & Dannenberg, 2006) due to its apparently unsystematic distribution of properties. Furthermore, it has been noted for its curious properties with respect to Principle B (Fodor, 1992). It appears that the Personal Dative construction violates Principle B, as it allows a pronoun to be coreferential with a local antecedent. This requires either a novel analysis of the Personal Dative, or a revision of the generalizations concerning pronouns. Finally, although the Personal Dative appears to behave like the reflexive *–self* in many ways, the Personal Dative is not acceptable with some verbs that allow the selection of the standard reflexive, as in (2).

- (2) a. *I hurt me
b. I hurt myself

This leaves the exact distribution and characterization of these pronouns a mystery.

In this paper, we investigate the properties of the Personal Dative construction, and argue it reflects a more general phenomenon found across languages. Specifically, we claim that although the pronoun in the Personal

Dative construction appears to be a standard pronoun, it is actually a reflexive, demonstrating properties of one type of reflexive pronouns. Furthermore, we are able to capture its distribution in a systematic way, undermining the evidence this construction is idiomatic.

Cross-linguistically, there are two different types of anaphors: simplex anaphors (SE anaphors) and SELF anaphors (Reinhart and Reuland, 1993). SELF anaphors (complex reflexives) are reflexives such as *himself* in English or *zichzelf* in Dutch. SE anaphors are reflexives¹ are morphologically simplex, such as *zich* in Dutch. We argue that the Personal Dative is a case of an SE anaphor in Appalachian English.

Furthermore, we use data from the Personal Dative in Appalachian English to reflect on a current debate on the treatment of SE anaphors. The attempt to explain the distribution of SE anaphors has led to two competing theories of theta-role requirements of SE anaphors. One account, proposed by Lidz (2001), claims that SE anaphors, when accompanied by the proper verbal morphology, take their own theta role, equal to that of their antecedent. A second account, proposed by Reuland (2001), claims that SE anaphors are dependent upon their antecedent, and therefore, take no theta role of their own. Appalachian English, because it allows the Personal Dative in a non-theta-role assigning position, uniquely decides between these two hypotheses, in support of Reuland's theory.

The paper proceeds as follows. In section one, we provide a description of some key properties of the Personal Dative. In section two, we demonstrate evidence that the Personal Dative found in AE is a reflexive. We show that the PD is a bound variable, and patterns much like reflexives in other languages. In section three, we show that the Personal Dative patterns like SE anaphors (like *zich* in Dutch) in a number of ways, including meaning and distribution differences the SELF anaphor, *himself*. In section four, we review the two accounts of theta role assignment for SE anaphors, proposed by Lidz (2001) and Reuland (2001). In section five, we use the data concerning the Personal Dative in AE to argue that SE anaphors do not take a theta role, supporting the analysis by Reuland. Finally, in section six, we explore some remaining issues concerning case assignment and SE anaphors.

1. Description of the Personal Dative

In this section, we will outline some data concerning the Personal Dative construction, and some mysteries surrounding the construction.

¹ In this paper, we use the terms *reflexive* and *anaphor* interchangeably.

The Personal Dative² construction refers to a construction in which a pronoun is used in an object position, marked with accusative case, to be coreferential with its antecedent, as in as in ((3)a). In this paper, we will use the term ‘Personal Dative’ (PD) to refer to the pronoun in this position. These sentences have similar meaning to a sentence with the reflexive, as in (3b).

- (3) a. I bought me some sunglasses
b. I bought myself some sunglasses

This construction is used widely in Southern American English, however, we will primarily investigate the dialect specific to Appalachian English (AE), not because of dialectal differences, but because of the availability of documentation on the topic (Wolfram and Christian, 1976; Wolfram and Schilling-Estes, 1998).

The Personal Dative is not restricted to first person pronouns. It is available in all persons and numbers, as shown in (4) (Webelhuth & Dannenburg, 2006).

- (4) a. I_i got me_i some candy
b. We_i got us some_i candy
c. You_i got you_i some candy
d. He_i got him_i some candy
e. They_i got them_i some candy

The Personal Dative construction has a myriad of interesting properties that we will describe below, and return to in the course of this paper. First, the PD appears to be a violation of Principle B (Chomsky, 1981), as they appear to be pronouns that are coreferential with a local antecedent. Second, the PD occurs with a wide variety of verbs, but not others, leaving behind a curious distribution. Finally, the PD, although used in much the same way as a reflexive (5b), differs slightly in meaning (Fodor, 1992). Next, let us review each of these properties in turn.

1.1 Principle B Principle B (Chomsky, 1981) states that a pronoun may not be coreferential with an antecedent in its local domain. In General American (GA), this is the binding constraint that rules out interpretations like (5), because *him* can not be coreferential with an antecedent, *Fred*, in the same clause.

² This construction is also referred to as the ‘ethical dative’ (Fodor, 1992), although it appears this term is used for historical purposes rather than for descriptive reasons. Ethical datives, a pronoun in dative form accompanied by a preposition, are found in other languages, such as Greek and German (Malone, 1988); however, it is not clear the phenomenon we discuss here is identical.

- (5) a. *Fred_i likes him_i
 b. *Fred_i gave him_i a headache

The Personal Dative is of interest with respect to Principle B (Fodor, 1992). As we have seen, the Personal Dative object pronoun is coreferential with a locally c-commanding antecedent, as in (6). This appears to be a Principle B violation, because the c-commanding antecedent should not permit a local pronoun to corefer. Notice, this cannot be a property specific to constructions with indirect objects, as (5b) is of the same form as (6).

- (6) I bought me some sunglasses

The Personal Dative is of the same phonological form as a full pronoun³, and in (6), is coreferential with a local antecedent. Therefore, one mystery is how Personal Dative construction is permitted to violate Principle B. There are three possibilities we examine. One possibility is that Appalachian English does not obey Principle B at all. The second possibility is that Personal Datives are pronouns that are exempt from Principle B. Finally, it is possible that Personal Datives are not pronouns at all. We support the latter, suggesting that the Personal Dative is an anaphor with the same morphological form as the pronoun, giving the appearance of a Principle B violation. In the next section, we will review some data concerning the Personal Dative and its distribution with respect to different verbs.

1.2 Verbal Selection Interestingly, the PD appears in the same distribution as the SELF anaphor, *himself*, for many verbs (7) - (9) (examples from Webelhuth & Dannenberg, 2006 and Wolfram and Christian, 1976).

- (7) a. She_i went into the store to get her_i a pair of shoes
 b. She_i went into the store to get herself_i a pair of shoes
 (8) a. I shot me a pheasant
 b. I shot myself a pheasant
 (9) a. I finally did buy me a coffee pot
 b. I finally did buy myself a coffee pot

However, it is not the case that the Personal Dative is simply an altered pronunciation of the SELF anaphor. There is a second class of verbs in AE that permit SELF anaphors, but not the Personal Dative. In AE, the Personal Dative cannot be used as objects of the verbs in (10a) and (11a), whereas SELF anaphors

³ We will return to the pronunciation of pronouns in AE in section 5.2.

are permitted in this position (10b) and (11b) (Examples from Wolfram and Christian, 1976).

- (10) a. *I hurt me
- b. I hurt myself
- (11) a. *We could see us in the mirror
- b. We could see ourselves in the mirror

The examples in (10a) and (11a) also show that it can not be the case that AE is devoid of Principle B. If it were the case that Appalachian English had no constraint on reference of pronouns with local antecedents, then we would predict that these examples would be acceptable.

Furthermore, AE contains verbs that permit the PD, but not SELF anaphors, as shown in (12) and (13). (Examples from Wolfram and Christian, 1976).

- (12) a. I'm gonna write me a letter to the president
- b. *I'm gonna write myself a letter to the president
- (13) a. I only need to sell me a dozen more toothbrushes
- b. #I only need to sell myself a dozen more toothbrushes

These examples serve two purposes. One, they show that the Personal Dative is not simply an altered form of SELF anaphor⁴. Second, they show that the PD has its own distribution, which needs to be described. In the next section, we will turn to some meaning differences between the Personal Dative and the SELF anaphor that have been observed.

1.3 Meaning Differences We have just shown that the Personal Dative's distribution cannot be described by the distribution of SELF anaphors. This suggests that the Personal Dative, at least in some way, is different from the SELF anaphor. There is a further difference between the two types of pronouns, and that is meaning. Fodor (1992) observed that the Personal Dative has a slightly different interpretation than the SELF anaphor. The example with the Personal Dative (14b) means that *the whittling was for my own benefit*, as in, I did it for the enjoyment of whittling. However, ((14)a) does not have this interpretation, it only means that the stick went to *me* in the end, requiring a transfer of possession to the direct object.

⁴ It is not clear if SELF anaphor is used in AE to the same degree as it is used in General American, or if it is used as an emphatic. We put aside this issue here, but believe this is an issue of interest.

- (14) a. I whittled myself a stick
 b. I whittled me a stick
 (15) I whittled Bob a stick

Notice that the SELF anaphor, while requiring a transfer of possession, behaves identically to a full NP, as in (15). Therefore, we have an observation that the Personal Dative has a benefactive interpretation, which does not require the transfer of possession that is required in a typical double object construction. This interpretation is not available with either full NPs or SELF anaphors.

To this point, we have eliminated the possibility that AE is a language that does not respect Principle B. This leaves two potential explanations as to the apparent Principle B violations. Either the Personal Dative is a pronoun that is exempt due to some special status, or the PD is not a pronoun at all. In the next section, we argue for the latter possibility and review evidence that the Personal Dative is an anaphor.

2. Evidence for the Personal Dative as a Reflexive

The starting point of investigation of the Personal Dative is its behavior with respect to the SELF anaphor. We have seen that Personal Datives and the SELF anaphor have differing distribution and meanings, suggesting that, at least, the Personal Dative and the SELF anaphor are not fully interchangeable.

Languages have at least two different types of anaphors: SE anaphors, such as *zich* in Dutch, and SELF anaphors, such as *zichzelf* in Dutch and *himself* in English (Reinhart and Reuland, 1993). We claim the PD is actually an SE anaphor, predicting its differences in distribution from the English SELF anaphor. First, we will review the evidence PD has reflexive properties.

In this section, we begin by reviewing evidence (from Wolfram and Christian, 1976) that the Personal Dative cannot be obtained by a transformation from the benefactive construction. Then we show that the PD is a bound variable, and patterns with respect to possession like anaphors in other languages. This will lead us to conclude that the Personal Dative is an anaphor. In the next section, we investigate the Personal Dative's status as an anaphor with respect to the two different types of anaphors we have just covered. We claim that the distinction found in AE between the PD and SELF anaphors (*himself*) patterns like the SE/SELF anaphor distinction noted across other languages (Reinhart and Reuland, 1993), suggesting the PD is an SE anaphor. Let us now turn to the investigation of the PD as an anaphor.

2.1 Against PD as a transformation from the *for*-Construction In the last section, we showed that the Personal Dative is not simply a replacement for the SELF anaphor in English. However, from the meaning differences between the

SELF anaphor and the Personal Dative, we found that the Personal Dative has a benefactive meaning, that is, it does not require the transfer of possession. Therefore, before arguing that the Personal Dative is an anaphor, we must show that the PD can not be obtained by a transformation of a benefactive construction.

As noted in the previous section, the PD has a benefactive interpretation, perhaps suggesting that it is a transformation from the benefactive *for*-construction, as ((16)a) has roughly the same meaning as (16b).

- (16) a. I bought me some sunglasses
b. I bought some sunglasses for me

The pair in ((16)) have similar meaning, and thus, are likely candidates to be transformations of one another. Notice that if the Personal Dative construction is derived via a transformation, this may be an indication as to why these pronouns have special status with respect to Principle B.

Wolfram and Christian (1976) found that it is not the case that the Personal Dative occurs in the same distribution as the benefactive, as shown in ((17)).

- (17) a. I'm gonna write me a letter to the president
b. I'm gonna write a letter to the president for Fred
c. *I'm gonna write Fred a letter to the president

Notice in ((17)a) that the Personal Dative can be used in this construction. Furthermore, the *for*-construction can be used, as in ((17)b)⁵. However, the *for*-construction can not be directly translated into the indirect object construction, as shown in ((17)c). Therefore, there is not a one to one mapping between the *for*-construction and the indirect object Personal Dative.

Although the Personal Dative frequently mirrors the distribution of *for*-constructions, this is an inadequate description of its distribution. This suggests that the PD is not derived from some other construction. Furthermore, this leaves the PD's exemption from Principle B unexplained. We will review the evidence for the Personal Dative's status as an anaphor next.

2.2 The Personal Dative's Status as an Anaphor In this section, we will investigate some evidence for treating the Personal Dative as an anaphor.

⁵ One may question whether in (8b) *a letter to the president* is acting as one NP, in which case, the structure would be V NP PP. However, the relevant contrast is (8a) and (8c), which holds as a contrast, suggesting a difference between a full NP and the Personal Dative.

2.2.1 Bound Variable We have seen that the Personal Dative is not able to be achieved by a transformation from the *for*-construction, leaving unexplained how the PD is a pronoun that is not subject to Principle B. One possible analysis is that these are regular pronouns that are exempt from Principle B by some special status. Under the binding theory formulated by Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993), only bound variables are subject to binding principles. Therefore, it is conceivable that the Personal Dative avoids being subject to the restrictions of binding by strictly being coreferential with its antecedent. In this section, we show that the PD is a bound variable, behaving just like an anaphor. This suggests that these are not pronouns with some special status with respect to Principle B, but are actually anaphors.

Let us explore the possibility that the Personal Dative is a standard pronoun, but is somehow exempt from Principle B. Because only bound variables are subject to binding constraints, a pronoun can be coreferential to a locally c-commanding antecedent and evade Principle B⁶. The coreferential interpretation can be seen under ellipsis. In ((18)a), the pronoun can be taken to refer to *Mary*, and thus, under ellipsis, the interpretation of the conjunct clause is *Mary likes Mary*, called the strict interpretation.

- (18) Jon likes Mary, Susan likes her, and Mary does too!
 a. OK Mary likes Mary [strict interpretation, coreferential]
 b. *Mary likes herself [sloppy interpretation, bound variable]

The coreferential interpretation yields a strict interpretation under ellipsis, whereas the bound variable interpretation yields a sloppy interpretation. If the Personal Dative were exempt from Principle B because it is not a bound variable, and falls under an exception, then we would expect the bound variable interpretation to be unavailable. That is, under ellipsis, we would not expect sloppy interpretations, because bound variables are subject to Principle B.

This expectation is not borne out, as shown in ((19)).

- (19) I bought me a pair of shoes, and Nell did too
 OK Nell bought herself a pair [sloppy interpretation]

⁶ Of course, there are complications concerning how, exactly, a pronoun avoids Principle B by coreference, but we abstract away from that point here. Showing that the Personal Dative is a bound variable obviates the need for this depth of discussion.

The Personal Dative is permitted with the sloppy interpretation⁷, suggesting it is a bound pronoun. This is irreconcilable with the idea that the Personal Dative is a pronoun with a special status with respect to Principle B.

We suggest that the Personal Dative is an anaphor. In this case, we would expect the PD to be locally bound. This is exactly what we see in General American, where anaphors must be locally bound. With the SELF anaphor, the sloppy interpretation is obtained, as in ((20)).

- (20) Bill shaved himself, and Frank did too
 OK Frank shaved himself [sloppy interpretation]

Reflexives require a bound variable interpretation, giving rise to sloppy interpretations under ellipsis. The fact that bound variable interpretations are permitted with the Personal Dative suggests that it is an anaphor, and not a pronoun with an exception with respect to Principle B. We will present one more piece of evidence that the Personal Dative behaves like a reflexive. Then, we will refine our notion of reflexive to show that the Personal Dative behaves like a subclass of anaphors, namely the SE anaphors, observed in other languages.

2.2.2 Possession Recall, we discussed that the Personal Dative does not require transfer of possession. Interestingly, this same observation occurs with anaphors in benefactive constructions in other languages. In Kannada, a sentence in ((21)), containing the benefactive dative, can have two interpretations (Lidz and Williams, 2004).

- (21) a. Rashmi tann-age keek-annu suTTu-koND-aLu
Rashmi self-DAT cake-ACC prepare-VRM.PST-3SF
 ‘Rashmi made a cake for herself.’
 b. adare ad-annu tann-a taayi-ge koTT-aLu
 but it-ACC she-GEN mother-DAT give.PST-3SF
 ‘...but she gave it to her mother.’

That is, the interpretation of ((21)a) is available that the cake is *for Rashmi*. However, the interpretation that the *cake was given to her mother, for the benefit of Rashmi* is also available, as shown in ((21)b).

These two interpretations are not available with full NPs as dative objects.

⁷ We do not have data concerning if the strict interpretation is available as well. However, the interpretation of such results depends on the interpretation of ‘identity under ellipsis’. Because the Personal Dative is identical in morphological form to the pronoun, one may expect the strict interpretation with the elided pronoun available.

- (22) a. Nannu Rashmi-ge keek-annu suTT-u-koTT-e
I rashmi-DAT cake-ACC prepare-PP-BEN.PST-IS
 ‘I made Rashmi a cake...’
- b. ?? adare ad-annu nann-a taayi-ge koTT-e
but it-ACC I-GEN mother-DAT give.PST-IS
 ‘...but I gave it to my mother.’

In ((22)), the only reading available is that *Rashmi received the cake*. The interpretation where *the mother is the owner, for Rashmi’s benefit* is unavailable.

Just as we have seen in English, full NPs in a benefactive construction in Kannada require transfer of possession. However, the SE anaphor does not. Recall, that the Personal Dative also does not require the transfer of possession. This is further evidence that the Personal Dative is not a full NP, but is an anaphor.

We also find further examples where the PD does not require transfer of possession. In ((23)), the friend is the owner of the present, and the benefit is to the person in the indirect object (Example from (Wolfram and Christian, 1976)).

- (23) He went to the store to buy him a present for his friend

That is, with the Personal Dative, the object in the benefactive construction can be the possessor, permitting the indirect object (the Personal Dative) to be the benefactor. This is not available with full NP indirect objects. In this way, we see that the Personal Dative in AE patterns with regard to possession like the SE anaphor in Kannada.

We see a similar phenomenon demonstrated in ((24)), where the purchaser is unspecified, but the benefit is to the person in the indirect object.

- (24) I only need to sell me a dozen more toothbrushes

Clearly, in (24), if the speaker’s goal is to earn money, then the speaker can’t also be the purchaser. Therefore, there is no transfer of possession to the direct object, and the Personal Dative patterns like a reflexive in other languages.

The evidence from interpretations under ellipsis and possession interpretations suggests that the Personal Dative behaves as an anaphor. By morphological form alone, it seems obvious that the Personal Dative, *me* or *him* must be an SE anaphor. We have also seen that with respect to transfer of possession, the PD hints at being an SE anaphor. However, in the next section, we show that the PD shares many additional distribution similarities with SE anaphors in other languages. This lends support to our claim that the Personal Dative in AE is a genuine SE anaphor. Finally, this resolves the Principle B

mystery: Personal Datives appear in violation to Principle B because they are actually anaphors.

3. Comparison with other SE anaphors

We have shown that the Personal Dative is an anaphor, not a pronoun. In this section, we show by distribution and meaning differences that the Personal Dative is a SE anaphor, and patterns exactly as we would expect with respect to the SELF anaphor, *himself*.

In this section, we will look at Personal Datives, as compared with other SE anaphors. We suggest that the distributions of these two types of pronouns closely mirror one another, and argue that the Personal Dative is an instance of an SE anaphor in Appalachian English (AE).

3.1 Distribution with verbs Recall, the Personal Dative does not occur in the same distribution as the SELF anaphor. That is, although there are verbs which permit both, there are also verbs which only allow either the PD or the SELF anaphor. This pattern, too, is repeated when we turn to languages, like Dutch, that have both types of anaphors.

Just as in AE, Dutch has verbs which permit both the SE anaphor, *zich* and the SELF anaphor, *zichzelf*, as shown in ((25)). (All Dutch examples from Reuland, 2001).

- (25) a. Oscar wast zich
Oscar washes zich
b. Oscar wast zichzelf
Oscar washes himself

Furthermore, in Dutch, we see there are cases where the SELF anaphor can be used ((26)), but the SE anaphor cannot be ((27)).

- (26) Oscar haat zichzelf
Oscar hates himself
(27) *Oscar haat zich
Oscar hates zich

Therefore, it appears that there are cases where the SE and SELF anaphors have differing distributions, just as the Personal Dative and SELF anaphors have differing distributions. We will wait until section (5) to give an account of the Personal Dative's exact distribution of occurrence. For now, we simply notice that the pattern appears to closely follow that of other SE anaphors.

Next, we will continue to examine the similarities between the Personal Dative and SE anaphors as support for our claim that the Personal Dative is an instance of an SE anaphor.

3.2 Meaning differences Recall that a meaning distinction in AE exists between the Personal Dative and SELF anaphors. This difference, too, is seen cross-linguistically. First, we will review the Dutch facts, then return to AE.

In ‘Madame Tussaud’ contexts, we see that the SE and SELF anaphors permit different interpretations. Imagine the following situation.

Ringo Starr walks into Madame Tussaud’s Wax Museum and sees a statue of himself in wax and a mirror. Ringo decides he needs a shave.

(28) Ringo shaved himself

It has been observed that the pronoun in object position used to describe the act of shaving alters the available interpretations (Jackendoff, 1992). There are two possible interpretations of (28). Either *Ringo shaved his statue* (which is a representation of himself) or *Ringo shaved his own body*. In both Kannada (Lidz, 2001) and Dutch (Reuland, 2001), which have SE and SELF-anaphors, it has been observed that a sentence with a SELF anaphor, *tann-annu-taane* in (29), is ambiguous. It can either mean *Hari saw his own person*, or that *he saw his statue*.

(29) Hari tann-annu-taane nood-id-a
Hari self-ACC-self see-PST-3SM
‘Hari saw himself (= Hari or statue)’

(30) Hari tann-annu nood-i-kond-a
Hari self-ACC see-PP-REFL.PST-3SM
‘Hari saw him (= Hari, *statue)’

However, a sentence with a SE anaphor, *tann-annu* in (30), can only mean that *Hari saw his own body*, and can not have the statue interpretation. SE anaphors require exact identity with their antecedent (i.e. the interpretation where *Ringo must shave his own body*), where complex antecedents need only some function of identity to its antecedent (i.e. a statue is a representation of Ringo). Said differently, there appears to be generalization that SELF anaphors can have both the statue and identity interpretations, while SE anaphors are restricted to only the identity interpretation.

This connects to our observations concerning transfer of possession. Recall, the Personal Dative does not require transfer of possession, permitting the

Personal Dative to be identical to its antecedent. However, the SELF anaphor requires transfer of possession, meaning that the anaphor is a function of its antecedent (14).

The difference previously observed in interpretation between the Personal Dative and the SELF anaphor can be cast in the light of SE anaphors. Overall, we confirm the generalization that the SE anaphors (and, by analogy, the Personal Dative) require identity with their antecedent, whereas SELF anaphors may represent the antecedent, but take on a slightly different role (either representation, as in a statue, or a new status, such required transfer of possession).

3.3 Summary In this section, we have shown that the differences between the Personal Dative and the SELF anaphor in English are mirrored in languages which show an SE/SELF anaphor distinction. We have concluded that the Personal Dative is an SE anaphor in Appalachian English. In the next section, we will review two analyses that have been proposed for SE anaphors.

4. Analysis of SE anaphors

In this paper, we argue that the Personal Dative is an SE anaphor, just like Dutch *zich*. We have reviewed some similarities between the distribution of SE anaphors and the Personal Dative. Next, we turn to examining two proposals that have been made concerning SE anaphors. One proposal claims that SE anaphors occur with reflexivized predicates, and the predicate equates the two theta roles (Lidz, 2001). The second proposal claims that SE anaphors are different types of pronouns, are underspecified for features, and do not require a theta role (Reuland, 2001). We argue for the second approach, the only approach that can account for the distribution of the Personal Dative.

4.1 Lidz Lidz (2001) observes that SE anaphors have complete identity with their antecedent, while SELF anaphors simply maintain a close identity to their antecedent, as represented in (31)⁸.

- (31) a. $\lambda x [P(x, x)]$ SE anaphors
 b. $\lambda x [P(x, f(x))]$ SELF anaphors

In ((31)a), both arguments of the predicate, P, are identical in reference, while in ((31)b), the second argument is a function of the first argument, allowing it to be related, but non-identical in reference.

⁸ Lidz (2001) calls SE anaphors *pure-reflexives*, because they must maintain exact identity to their antecedents, and refers to SELF anaphors as *near-reflexives*, although we will maintain the SE/SELF anaphor distinction.

Lidz observes Kannada has both an SE anaphor, *tann-annu*, and a SELF anaphor, *tann-annu-taane*. How do we arrive at the generalization that the SE anaphors have complete identity with their antecedent? First, recall the Madame Tussaud contexts from section (3.2). With the SE anaphor, only the identity interpretation is available, whereas with the SELF anaphor, both the statue and identity interpretations are available. This supports the observation that SELF anaphors may be a function of their antecedent, and need not be identical.

Secondly, the distribution of *tann-annu* and *tann-annu-taane* differ with respect to different verbs. That is, there verbs which allow the SELF anaphor ((33)), but not the SE anaphor ((32)).

- (32) *Hari tann-annu hode-d-a
 Hari self-ACC hit-PST-3SM
 ‘Hari hit himself’
- (33) Hari tann-annu-taane hode-d-a
 Hari self-ACC-self hit-PST-3SM
 ‘Hari hit himself’

However, Kannada also has reflexive markings on the verb, making the connection between type of reflexive and verbal requirements more straight forward. Lidz shows verbs which ordinarily require the SELF anaphor may take the SE anaphor when the verb is reflexively marked ((34)).

- (34) Hari tann-annu hode-du-kon-d-a
 Hari self-ACC hit-PP-REFL-PST-3SM
 ‘Hari hit himself’

This suggests there is a mapping between the reflexivisation of the verb, and the arguments permitted. The SE anaphor is permitted only when the verb is reflexively marked. The SELF anaphor appears to be able to take a theta role on its own, but the theta role of the SE anaphor is dependent upon its antecedent.

To describe this difference in distribution, Lidz proposes Condition R, a mapping between the semantics of a pronoun and the theta grid, as shown in ((35)).

- (35) $\lambda x [P(x, x)] \Leftrightarrow (\theta_1 = \theta_2)$

When the verb is reflexivized, the two theta roles are equated. This accounts for why, on the Madame Tussaud cases, SE anaphors can only have the interpretation that *Ringo is shaving his own body*, and not the statue interpretation.

Therefore, under this view, there is nothing inherently different about these two types of pronouns with regard to theta positions. The only difference between SE and SELF anaphors is that SE anaphors occur with reflexive-marked predicates. The theta differences come from Condition R, which transmits semantic properties to the syntactic representation.

4.2 Reuland Reuland's (2001) approach crucially differs from that of Lidz's approach in that SE and SELF anaphors are treated as different types of pronouns, not just with respect to their predicate role. According to Reuland, SE anaphors are deficient with respect to their phi features, and therefore are syntactically dependent on their antecedent, forming a syntactic chain with their antecedent. With only one theta role permitted per chain, the result is that SE anaphors do not receive theta roles. SELF anaphors behave as standard arguments, receiving a theta role (with some function of identity required by the semantics)⁹.

Reuland claims that SE anaphors are underspecified in their phi features for number. Evidence for this underspecification comes from observations concerning *zich* pronouns.

- (36) Hij_i /Zij_i volde zich_i wegglijden
he/they felt zich slide away

In ((36)), *zich* is underspecified for number, since it can occur with both singular and plural antecedents. Because SE anaphors are deficient in phi features, they must form a chain with their antecedent to be realized. Therefore, SE anaphors do not take their own theta role, because there can only be one theta role per chain. SE anaphors are bound in the syntactic level of representation.

On the contrary, SELF anaphors do take their own theta role as a result of the *self* morpheme. SELF anaphors do not form a chain with their antecedents, and therefore, behave just like regular arguments. They are bound in the semantic level of representation.

Reuland derives the observation that SE anaphors require exact identity with their antecedent as a result of syntactic binding, whereas SELF anaphors are bound in the semantic domain. In the next section, we will compare Reuland's and Lidz's approaches with respect to how they account for the Personal Dative data.

5. Accounts of SE Anaphors and the Personal Dative

⁹ Reuland (2001) contains an extended discussion of the role of SELF anaphors. For our purposes, the critical fact is that they take their own theta role, and thus, we abstract away from the details of theta role assignment.

We have reviewed two accounts concerning SE anaphors which make slightly different claims. Lidz claims that SE anaphors, by Condition R, take the theta role identical to their antecedent. Reuland claims that SE anaphors are deficient in their phi features, are syntactically bound, and take no theta role of their own. In the languages investigated by Lidz and Reuland (Dutch, Icelandic and Kannada), there is no empirical evidence for either of these hypotheses¹⁰. In this section, we will view these two accounts in light of data from AE, and suggest the no-theta-role account by Reuland is on the right track.

We will show that the existence of verbs in AE that allow the SE anaphor but not the SELF anaphor, as well as dialectal differences according to the person phi features, support the account proposed by Reuland.

5.1 Theta Role Differences When we investigated Madame Tussaud Contexts in section (3.2), we saw that the Personal Dative and SELF anaphor, *himself*, differ in interpretation. We have also seen that the PD and SELF anaphor differ with respect to distribution with verbs. In this section, we will explore how the accounts of Lidz and Reuland account for these differences, and suggest the account proposed by Reuland is on the right track.

It appears that the Personal Dative, and all SE anaphors, require exact identity with the antecedent, whereas the SELF anaphor behaves as a real argument to the verb (i.e. receives an actual theta role from the verb, that is non-identical to the antecedent). This difference is predicted by both Lidz and Reuland.

For Reuland, the SE anaphor forms a chain, therefore obtaining direct identity with the antecedent. SELF anaphors take their own theta role, and therefore, we do not have exact identity, yielding the statue interpretation. This suggests that the SELF anaphor would pattern just like any other argument, such as a full NP, which is the case.

Lidz's Condition R equates the theta role of the Personal Dative to its antecedent, requiring identity. Because SELF anaphors get their own theta role, we expect meaning differences.

Therefore, the accounts proposed by Lidz and Reuland both predict the meaning differences between SE and SELF anaphors. Let us now turn to differences with respect to verbal distribution.

A verb like *bought* optionally has two or three theta roles, so it can take either one object (38b) or two (37). A SELF anaphor behaves just like a regular argument, so we expect it to pattern with full NPs, as in (37). However, we also see that *bought* can take a Personal Dative (38a).

¹⁰ Differences between the two accounts arise with respect to the distribution of long distance reflexives, but we do not investigate this point, here.

- (37) a. I bought myself a coat
 b. I bought Fred a coat
- (38) a. I bought me a coat
 b. I bought a coat

Lidz and Reuland disagree on how to describe (38b). Lidz claims that in the case with an SE anaphor, *bought* assigns three theta roles, but two of the theta roles are identical by Condition R. From this viewpoint, SE anaphors behave much like SELF anaphors. Reuland claims that in a case like (38b), only two theta roles are assigned. This treats SE anaphors similarly to the null object cases, in that it requires *bought* to assign two theta roles; and it is the SELF anaphor that stands alone in requiring three theta roles. This is shown in Table (1).

Table 1: Number of theta roles assigned by *bought*, by object type

	SELF anaphor	SE anaphor	Null object
Lidz	3	3	2
Reuland	3	2	2

Now, we have predictions concerning null object cases and the Personal Dative with respect to possession. We have seen that the SELF anaphor requires transfer of possession, as in ((39)).

- (39) *I bought myself a coat for my friend

If the Personal Dative and null object pattern together with respect to meaning, this would support Reuland’s hypothesis. However, if the Personal Dative patterns with the SELF anaphor, this would support Lidz’s hypothesis.

We find that both the Personal Dative and null object do not require possession, as shown in ((40)), in contrast to the SELF anaphor.

- (40) a. I bought me a coat for my friend
 b. I bought a coat for my friend

This suggests, at least with respect to one view of meaning, that the null object and SE anaphor pattern together. We suggest this is one piece of evidence in support of the view that SE anaphors do not receive an independent theta role, explaining their distribution in meaning with a null object.

5.2 Dialectal Variation with the Personal Dative With the Personal Dative construction, many speakers of General American accept coreference when the pronoun is in the first person, allowing ((41)), but not ((42)).

- (41) I bought me a soda
 (42) Harry_i bought him_i some cake

Interestingly, this falls out as a direct result of Reuland's analysis. Reuland claims that first and second person are not specified for number, because they appear to be immune to the chain condition. Let's begin by looking at the third person. *He* and *they* are both third person male, and the only feature that differs is the number of males included. However, *I* and *we* differ in the people included. That is, *we* is not simply multiple *Is*, where *they* can be described by having multiple *hes*. Therefore, number is not required for first and second person, and these pronouns maintain the option of forming a chain with their antecedent. He predicts coreference is possible first and second person pronouns, independent of the status of the third person pronouns. This predicts coreference to be available in ((41)), because the first person pronouns are permitted to form a chain.

The dialectal variation we see between GA and AE is that the two dialects differ in whether coreference is permitted in third person. Under a Reuland-type story, third person pronouns in AE are underspecified for number, but the GA pronouns are not deficient. This explains why ((42)) in GA is unacceptable, but permitted in AE.

This account claims that there are differences for specification of number in third person pronouns as a result of underspecification for number in AE, but not GA. This predicts we should expect to see a difference with respect to the number specification in the third person between the two dialects in pronunciation. This prediction is borne out. In GA, there is a difference in number in the third person masculine, as shown in ((43)) and ((44)).

- (43) Fred told Bill that Mary likes him
 (44) Fred told his friends that Mary likes them

Therefore, we predict coreference to be blocked in the local configuration, which is the case.

However, the Appalachian English case is different. Notice, in Appalachian, there is no number difference in third person when in object position, with number, as shown in ((45)) and ((46)).

- (45) Fred told Bill that Mary likes 'em
 (46) Fred told his friends that Mary likes 'em
 (47) It was about these people moved out on the prairie and they build 'em a house (Wolfram and Christian, 1976)

This suggests that the underspecification for number in third person in AE arises in pronunciation¹¹. This predicts availability of coreference for them as SE anaphors, the desired result¹².

The difference between SE and SELF anaphors for Lidz results from a reflexive marking on the verb. His account makes no distinction between person, predicting no difference across person phi features.

The presence of differences in binding across person features in GA suggests phi features are relevant, supporting Reuland's account.

5.3 Types of Verbs Let us review the distribution of the Personal Dative with respect to verbs. The Personal Dative, as we have seen, can occur in the following contexts.

One, the Personal Dative can occur as an object of a ditransitive verb, as in ((48)):

(48) I bought me a shirt

Because these verbs are optionally transitive ((49)) or ditransitive, a theory must minimally specify this distribution. If these verbs are optionally transitive, then Reuland's account naturally follows, because *bought* need only assign two theta roles.

(49) I bought some cookies

As we have reviewed, Lidz can account for this distribution, but must also stipulate that *bought* can be reflexive marked in order to get the Personal Dative to occur, as SE anaphors require reflexive marking under Condition R¹³. Reuland does not require reflexive marking of the verb, a desirable step in a language like English, where this marking has no phonological realization, and therefore, should be used with caution.

Two, we have seen there are situations in which the SELF anaphor can occur, but not the SE anaphor, as in ((50)).

(50) a. *I hurt me

¹¹ Interestingly, there is a difference in number in the subject position, as shown in (47(47)).

¹² It is the case that, although *him* and *them* may be pronounced the same, the same argument does not hold for *her*. However, if it is the case there is no plural counterpart for *her*, the argument used for *I/we* may hold here.

¹³ It is slightly unclear what reflexive marking means in a ditransitive construction. It appears that 'to reflexive mark' a verb means to remove a theta role, but in this case, Lidz's theory would reduce to Reuland's account, so we must be careful here.

- b. I hurt myself

Verbs like *hate* and *see* must assign two theta roles. According to Reuland, the fact that a Personal Dative cannot occur in these constructions is predicted, because a SE anaphor does not take a theta role, and will result in a theta-criterion violation. In order to account for this distribution, Lidz must claim that *hate* and *see* are not reflexive marked, and therefore, cannot take an SE anaphor. We must also be careful here, to say why these verbs can not be reflexive marked in English. Recall, to derive the facts about *bought*, Lidz must say that *buy* can be reflexively marked with a null element, so then it is up to the learner to determine where this null marking can and cannot occur.

It appears that, although these two accounts account for the facts in differing ways, and Reuland's account succeeds without the additional notion of reflexive-marking, both accounts can capture the distribution facts of SE anaphors.

From these two accounts, we have differing predictions. Lidz predicts the Personal Dative can occur only in theta assigning positions, where Reuland permits SE anaphors in positions with case, but no theta role to assign. The examples from AE show that the Personal Dative can occur in non-theta role assigning environments. Observe the examples in ((51)) – ((53)).

- (51) a. She ate her some lunch (Wolfram and Schilling-Estes, 1998)
b. *She ate herself some lunch
- (52) a. I'm gonna write me a letter to the president
(Wolfram and Christian, 1976)
b. *I'm gonna write myself a letter to the president
- (53) a. I need me a gun (Internet)
b. *I need myself a gun

In these cases, verbs without an indirect object theta role to assign permit the Personal Dative (51a)-(53b). These are cases where the SELF anaphor is not allowed (51b)-(53b). This goes against Lidz's predictions, that SE anaphors should appear only where SELF anaphors are allowed.

Interestingly, this suggests that the distribution of SE anaphors falls out once we determine that SE anaphors do not require a theta role. Furthermore, this may argue against reflexive marking in English. Although reflexive marking occurs in Kannada, we suggest that equality of theta roles suggested by Lidz is captured by Reuland's approach. Lidz's facts can be captured by stating that reflexive marking serves to decrease the number of theta roles a verb assigns. Therefore, the relevant data points are captured, and no Condition R is required.

5.4 Summary We have reviewed evidence from theta role assignment, dialectal variation with person and verb distribution that suggests that Reuland's analysis is on the right track for describing the Personal Dative, and more generally, SE anaphors. In the next section, we will discuss some remaining issues concerning case assignment and SE anaphors.

6. Case Assignment

We have made the claim that SE anaphors do not require a theta role. Therefore, we would expect that in any place an SE anaphor can be used, the null object can be used, because the SE anaphor does not contribute additional thematic information. However, in Dutch, this is not the case. The verb *behave* permits the SE anaphor ((54)), but does not permit a null object, as we would predict ((55)).

- (54) Oscar gedraagt zich
 Oscar behaves zich
(55) *Oscar gedraagt
 Oscar behaves

A parallel phenomenon appears in AE. The direct object is required with a verb like *bought* in AE in ((56)), but can appear in GA (but not AE) without a direct object ((57))¹⁴.

- (56) I bought me a soda
(57) I bought a soda

Therefore, we must describe not only when SE anaphors can and can't occur, but also when their absence can occur. In this section, we discuss case assignment as a way to describe the required distribution of SE anaphors.

6.1 Lack of null objects in Dutch For Dutch, we have the following questions: why can't Dutch verbs, which permit SE anaphors, be used without a direct object? Similarly, the same question arises in AE. How can we account for the requirement of SE anaphors in certain distributions, if they perform the same theta requirements as no object at all? In order to answer this question, we must lay out our assumptions about case and theta role assignment.

¹⁴ It is possible that *bought* can appear with a null object in AE, but this optionality would be difficult to tell apart from code-switching to GA. For the purposes of this paper, we assume the null object is not an option, but optionality can be built into this system if needed, but it increases the lexical information required.

For this paper, we assume that all SE anaphors, even the Personal Dative, require case. Even though SE anaphors do not require theta roles, they do require case, as they cannot occur in non-case assignment positions ((58))¹⁵ and ((59)).

(58) *Mary tried her to win

(59) *I'm gonna sleep me

(Fodor, 1992)

Therefore, the relevant item at issue is the number of theta roles that are assigned. We assume that number of theta roles is semantically related to the verb. It is clear that some verbs have optional specifications: *eat* can be either with one or two theta roles. Therefore, it must be lexically determined how many theta roles there are.

Here is where we take our departure (that we believe to be central in Reuland's approach) from Lidz's account. Lidz assumes that a reflexive, like ((60)) actually has two theta roles assigned, even in English.

(60) He shaved

That is, there is a shaver, and a shavee, whether or not both of these are represented in the overt syntax. Therefore, when there is an SE anaphor, it simply takes the theta role that is assigned, even to null objects¹⁶. We claim that SE anaphors pattern like null objects in that neither requires an object theta role. In the case of ((60)), there must be a shaver and a shavee, but notice there are other cases in which there is a restriction on null objects¹⁷.

(61) Taroo ate

(62) Taroo ate lunch

(63) Taroo ate his shoe

Eat can be a transitive or an intransitive verb. In the case where it is intransitive ((61)), there is still something being eaten. It is well known that the object of *eat* is restricted to something expected, perhaps ((62)), but not ((63)). We suggest that the reflexive problem is exactly the same. Therefore, with shaving, even

¹⁵ This is a non-native judgment, so is subject to verification. However, this construction is lacking in a search, where most other verbs with the PD provide plenty of examples.

¹⁶ Notice that this is not in contradiction to the point made before with respect to the difference between SE anaphors and null objects, because null objects do not require a reflexivized predicate.

¹⁷ It may not be the case that the restriction on interpretation with the null object of *eat* is the proper analogy. Another possible interpretation is that reflexive verbs are unaccusative, as they are in other languages. In which case, the interpretation would be something like *I was shaved*. In any case, our point here is that we do not believe there exists sufficient evidence to treat reflexive verbs as necessarily containing two theta roles.

though there is something being shaved, it is pragmatically restricted to something expected, and in this case, it is your own person. We do not believe this is evidence there are two theta roles, or else there would need to be loads of theta roles that are not specified by overt objects, an undesirable result.

Let us use this assumption to examine why items like ((64)) are bad in AE, as well as the same ones in Dutch.

(64) *I shaved me

We must also lay out our assumptions concerning case assignment. We will assume that all case positions must be filled in the languages we are talking about, however case is lexically specified. So, for example, *eat* may assign either one or two cases, so it appears that either one or two may be filled. A verb like *seem* has one case assigner, and it must be filled in English, as in ((65)). It is clear that *seem* does not assign a theta role to this position ((66)).

(65) There seems to be a man in the room

(66) *Bob seems to be a man in the room

So, we will assume all case positions must be filled, although this appears vacuous at this point.

Shave has the option of taking one theta role or two theta roles. In GA, it can either assign one or two cases, yielding ((67)) and ((68)).

(67) I shaved

(68) I shaved Joe

However, the facts in Dutch can be described by stating Dutch has the same theta requirements, but is specified to assign two cases (therefore, assigning one case is not an option). This yields the data seen in ((69)) – ((71)).

(69) *Max scheert

Max shaves

(70) Max scheert zich

Max shaves SE

(71) Max scheert zichzelf

Max shaves SELF

((71)) assigns only one theta role, and *zich* acts solely to pick up the stranded case.

Therefore, by assuming that every case must be filled, we can explain why Dutch does not allow null objects. In the next section, we will extend this idea to ditransitive constructions in AE.

5.2 Appearance in Ditransitive We have accounted for the distribution of SE anaphors in AE; however, there is another generalization we have not discussed, and to which something needs to be said. There are verbs like *need*, *had*, *want*, etc., which appear as ditransitives, although these are not the standard constructions for these types of verbs.

- (72) I need me a gun
(73) We had us a cabin (Wolfram and Christian, 1976)
(74) She wanted her some liver pudding (Wolfram and Christian, 1976)

According to our analysis, these verbs must have ditransitive case assignment configurations, even though they assign only two theta roles. Here, we can not provide any novel insight, but suggest that the ditransitive case assignment may be the default for AE verbs.

Interestingly, it appears that AE has regularized case assignment from GA. In cases in GA where a verb optionally assigns one or two cases, the same verb in AE must assign two. Furthermore, in the cases above, it appears that AE has united two classes of verbs in GA. GA contains verbs that optionally assign either two or three cases (*bought*, *build*), and verbs that assign only two cases (*need*, *want*). AE has united these classes by requiring they all must assign three cases, leading to the generalization that many verbs in AE appear as ditransitives. Naturally, this analysis rests on the observation that sentences like (75) are rare in AE.

- (75) I need a gun

We have assumed that utterances like (75) are not in the grammar of AE, and when they appear, are instances of code-switching to GA. However, if this is found to not be the case, our analysis would need to be revised to include this optionality.

7. Conclusions

In this paper, we investigated the Personal Dative, a construction in Appalachian English that appears to permit a pronoun in a locally bound configuration. First, we determined that although the Personal Dative has the same morphological form as a pronoun, it is actually an anaphor, in that it can be

bound and has similarities with respect to interpretation as anaphors in other languages.

Cross-linguistically, there are two types of anaphors: SE and SELF anaphors. We determined from distributional and interpretation evidence that the Personal Dative behaves as an SE anaphor. Therefore, we concluded that the Personal Dative is an example of an SE anaphor in Appalachian English.

We reviewed two competing theories for the SE anaphor. Lidz (2001) treats SE anaphors as arguments of the verb that are semantically bound, whereas Reuland (2001) treats SE anaphors as deficient in phi features, and claims they must be syntactically bound. This difference results in a difference in theta role assignment in the two competing theories. We showed that the availability of the Personal Dative in non-theta-role assigning positions supports Reuland's analysis. Furthermore, his analysis is uniquely able to describe differences across dialects with respect to specification of person.

Finally, we suggested that differences in requirements of the SE anaphor result from case assignment differences, perhaps suggesting that AE has regularized case assignment where General American has not.

The data from Appalachian English presented in this paper is a first attempt at a generative description of the Personal Dative, and also, presents novel support for a theta-role-less account of SE anaphors.

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