C-locality and the Interaction of Reflexives and Ditransitives

Jeffrey Lidz and Alexander Williams
Northwestern University and University of Pennsylvania

1. Introduction

In Kannada, ditransitives with benefactive morphology cannot have a reflexive indirect object, or have reflexive marking on the verb. This paper seeks to explain why. We argue that the benefactive structure, when its indirect object is a locally bound anaphor, is subject to two conflicting requirements. The anaphor must be local to its antecedent, and the direct object must be local to its Case licenser, but these conditions cannot be met in the same derivation. Thus reflexive benefactives are syntactically underivable. As the crucial conflict follows from the theory of object licensing introduced in Lidz and Williams 2002, our explanation provides additional support for that framework.

The primary data are presented in (1-4). In (1) we see the two types of ditransitive found in Kannada: the plain ditransitive (1a) and the benefactive ditransitive (1b). (1b) includes the benefactive auxiliary koDu, which attaches to the main verb in its past participle form and bears the tense and agreement inflection.

1. a. Hari Rashmi-ge pustaka-vannu kalis-id-a
   Hari Rashmi-DAT book-ACC send-PST-3SM
   ‘Hari sent a book to Rashmi.’

   b. Hari Rashmi-ge pustaka-vannu kalisi-koTT-a
   Hari Rashmi-DAT book-ACC send-BEN.PST-3SM
   ‘Hari sent a book to himself.’

In (2) we make the indirect object a reflexive anaphor: tann ‘self’. (2a) has the verbal reflexive morpheme koLLu (VRM), and this is grammatical. But adding the benefactive morpheme is impossible, (2b), either with or without the verbal reflexive.

2. a. Hari tann-age pustaka-vannu kalisi-koND-a
   Hari self-DAT book-ACC send-VRM.PST-3SM
   ‘Hari sent a book to himself.’
b. * Hari tann-age pustaka-vannu kalisi-(koNDu)-koTT-a
   Hari self-DAT book-ACC send-(VRM)-BEN.PST-3SM

The word order of (2a) is also important. Generally, the order of the dative and accusative arguments in a ditransitive is free, as shown in (3).

(3) a. Hari Rashmi-ge pustaka-vannu kalisi-(koTT)-a
   Hari Rashmi-DAT book-ACC send-(BEN.PST)-3SM
   ‘Hari sent a book to Rashmi.’

b. Hari pustaka-vannu Rashmi-ge kalisi-(koTT)-a
   Hari book-ACC Rashmi-DAT send-(BEN.PST)-3SM
   ‘Hari sent a book to Rashmi.’

However, when the dative argument is a locally bound anaphor, as in (4), the dative must precede the accusative.

(4)a. Hari tann-age pustaka-vannu kalisi-koND-a
   Hari self-DAT book-ACC send-VRM.PST-3SM
   ‘Hari sent a book to himself.’

b. * Hari pustaka-vannu tann-age kalisi-koND-a
   Hari book-ACC self-DAT send-VRM.PST-3SM

We propose a syntactic explanation of the facts in (1-2), relying on three points. First, we establish the basic hierarchical structure of the Kannada benefactive. Second, we observe the minimality properties of anaphor chains in Kannada, based on the word order fact in (4). Finally, we introduce the relation of c-locality and the theory of DP-licensing that uses this relation (Lidz and Williams 2002). Putting the pieces together, we will show that, given the structure of the benefactive, a dative anaphor cannot be local to its antecedent at the same time as an accusative object is local to its licenser. Simply put, reflexive benefactives are syntactically underivable.

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1 Speakers generally find ditransitives with accusative anaphors, such as (i-ii), odd to varying degrees, making it very difficult to determine whether these are even grammatical and if so, what structure they might have:

(i) % Hari bangalor-ige tann-annu kalisi-koND-a
   Hari Bangalore-DAT self-ACC send-VRM.PST-3SM
   ‘Hari sent himself to Bangalore.’

(ii) % Hari tann-annu bangalor-ige kalisi-koND-a
    Hari self-ACC Bangalore-DAT send-VRM.PST-3SM
    ‘Hari sent himself to Bangalore.’

2 The ungrammaticality of (2b) has traditionally been treated as due simply to the meaning of the benefactive morpheme. For example, Bhat (1979) says, “koDu indicates that the action referred to was carried out for the benefit of a person other than the agent himself” (see also Sridhar 1990). While this description is accurate, it is just that. If the lack of reflexive benefactives can be derived from independently motivated properties of the syntax, then we will have moved beyond description and achieved something of an explanation. Additionally, we will have preserved a simpler meaning for the benefactive morpheme.
2. Two structures for Kannada ditransitives

Lidz 2002 shows that benefactive and nonbenefactive ditransitives are distinct both in meaning and in structure. Semantically, the Kannada benefactives imply a transfer of possession, like double object constructions in English (Green 1974, Oerhle 1976, Harley 2000, among others). The person named by the dative is understood to receive the object named by the accusative. Thus (5a) cannot felicitously be followed by (5b).

(5)  a. nannu rashmi-ge keek-annu suTT-u-koTT-e
    I rashmi-DAT cake-ACC prepare-PP-BEN.PST-1S
    ‘I made rashmi a cake...’

        b. ?? adare ad-annu nann-a taayi-ge koTT-e
           but it-ACC I-GEN mother-DAT give.PST-1S
           ‘...but I gave it to my mother.’

In a nonbenefactive ditransitive, however, like (6a), there is no implication of transfer. So in this case the follow-up sentence, (6b), is acceptable.

(6)  a. nannu rashmi-ge keek-annu suTT-e
    I rashmi-DAT cake-ACC prepare-PST-1S
    ‘I made a cake for Rashmi...’

        b. adare ad-annu nann-a taayi-ge koTT-e
           but it-ACC I-GEN mother-DAT give.PST-1S
           ‘...but I gave it to my mother.’

Syntactically, we can see that the two ditransitives also differ in the hierarchical placement of their arguments. The distinct underlying structures can be determined by examining patterns of quantifier-variable binding (Barss and Lasnik 1986, Harley 2000, Bleam 2001).

In (7-8) we see the possible bindings between dative and accusative arguments in nonbenefactive ditransitives. Here, an accusative quantifier can bind into the dative regardless of whether it precedes the dative or follows it.

(7)  a. sampaadaka pratiyondu lekhana-vannu adar-a lekhan-ige kaLisida
       editor every article-ACC it-GEN author-DAT send-PST-3SM
       ‘The editor sent every article to its author.’ (ACC > DAT)

       b. sampaadaka adar-a lekhan-ige pratiyondu lekhana-vannu kaLis-id-a
          editor it-GEN author-DAT every article-ACC send-PST-3SM
          ‘The editor sent every article to its author.’ (DAT < ACC)

But a dative quantifier can bind into an accusative only if the dative comes first.
These facts indicate that the accusative argument is higher than the dative in underlying structure, as in (9).

(9)  
```
  vP
    / 
   v'   
      /    
     v     v
    /     /    
   DO_{ACC} V' IO_{DAT} V
```

When the dative precedes the accusative, the surface order must be derived by moving the dative above the accusative, as in (10).

(10)  
```
  vP
    / 
   v'   
      /    
     v     v
    /     /    
   t_{DAT} VP DO_{ACC} V'
```

Because this movement creates new binding possibilities, we conclude that it must be A-movement (Mahajan 1990).

Benefactive ditransitives, however, show the opposite pattern, as shown in (11-12). Here the dative can bind into the accusative, independent of word order.

(11)  
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a.  sampaadaka pratiyondu lekhan-vannu adara lekhan-ige koTT-a editor every article-ACC it-GEN author-DAT send-PP-BEN.PST-3SM 'The editor sent every article to its author.' (ACC > DAT)

b.  * sampaadaka adar-a lekhan-ige pratiyondu lekhan-vannu koTT-a editor it-GEN author-DAT every article-ACC send-PP-BEN.PST-3SM 'The editor sent every article to its author.' (* DAT < ACC)
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But the accusative can bind into Dative only when the accusative comes first:
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(12) a. sampaadaka pratiyobba lekhan-ige avaL-a lekhana-vannu kaLis-i-koTT-a
editor every author-DAT she-GEN article-ACC send-PP-BEN.PST-3SM
‘The editor sent every author her article.’ (DAT > ACC)

b. sampaadaka avaL-a lekhana-vannu pratiyobba lekhan-ige kaLis-i-koTT-a
editor she-GEN article-ACC every author-DAT send-PP-BEN.PST-3SM
‘The editor sent every author her article.’ (ACC < DAT)

So, for the benefactive, the dative must be higher than the accusative in the underlying structure, (13), with the accusative-dative order derived by A-movement, (14).

(13)

(14)

3. Which structure does the reflexive ditransitive have?

Recall now the reflexive ditransitive (2a), repeated here as (15).

(15) Hari tann-age pustaka-vannu kalisi-koND-a
Hari self-DAT book-ACC send-VRM.PST-3SM
‘Hari sent a book to himself.’

Here there is no benefactive morpheme, suggesting a nonbenefactive structure. But the dative precedes the accusative, suggesting a benefactive structure. So which is it?

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3 It would make no difference to the claims in this paper if we assigned Kannada benefactives the structure Pylkkänen (2002) gives her “low applicatives”: [vP V [IO DO Ben]]. According to Pylkkänen’s diagnostics, the Kannada benefactive does count as a “low applicative” semantically, since it cannot apply to unergatives or statives. But Pylkkänen’s syntax implies incorrectly that the BEN morpheme should precede the verb in Kannada, a head-final language. Hence we do not adopt it here.
The binding tests cannot be run for two reasons. First, the Kannada anaphor \textit{tann}- is subject oriented and so cannot be bound by an accusative quantifier independent of the word order. In addition, because anaphors are full DPs by themselves, they cannot contain an additional (non-subject oriented) anaphor to be bound by an accusative quantifier. The semantic test, however, indicates that the reflexive ditransitives do not have a benefactive structure. (16a), for example, does not entail that Rashmi herself receives the cake that she makes. She may make it for herself but give it to her mother, as in (16b).

We can therefore conclude that reflexive ditransitives have the plain ditransitive structure (9) and that the dative-accusative order of internal arguments is derived by A-movement of the dative to a higher position.

This now leaves us with the following question: Why can’t there be a reflexive benefactive? Given that reflexive ditransitives are nonbenefactive, we need to determine what blocks locally bound anaphors from occurring in a benefactive structure. Before answering this question, however, we must first take three short digressions examining (a) the word-order of reflexive ditransitives; (b) the distribution of VRM; and, (c) the theory of DP-licensing developed in Lidz and Williams 2002.

4. Word-order in reflexive ditransitives

As noted above, word-order is flexible in ditransitives but not in reflexive ditransitives. If the dative argument is a locally bound anaphor, the dative must precede the accusative, as in (17).

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As noted above, word-order is flexible in ditransitives but not in reflexive ditransitives. If the dative argument is a locally bound anaphor, the dative must precede the accusative, as in (17).

Having just concluded that (17a) is a plain ditransitive, we know it has the underlying structure (18), where the dative is lower than the accusative.

\begin{enumerate}
\item a. Rashmi tann-age keek-annu suTTu-koND-aLu
Rashmi self-DAT cake-ACC prepare-VRM.PST-3SF
\textquote{Rashmi made a cake for herself...}
\item b. adare ad-annu tann-a taayi-ge koTT-aLu
but it-ACC she-GEN mother-DAT give.PST-3SF
\textquote{...but she gave it to her mother.}
\end{enumerate}

\begin{enumerate}
\item a. Hari tann-age pustaka-vannu kalisi-koND-a
Hari self-DAT book-ACC send-VRM.PST-3SM
\textquote{Hari sent a book to himself.}
\item b. * Hari pustaka-vannu tann-age kalis (-koND / -id / -koTT) -a
Hari book-ACC self-DAT send (-VRM.PST / -PST / -BEN.PST) -3SM
\textquote{intended: ‘Hari sent a book to himself.’}
\end{enumerate}

Having just concluded that (17a) is a plain ditransitive, we know it has the underlying structure (18), where the dative is lower than the accusative.
Evidently this configuration is ill-formed, since the dative anaphor cannot remain *in situ* and follow the accusative. Instead, raising is required, yielding the surface structure (19).

On the assumption that the anaphor-antecedent relation is an A-chain (Rizzi 1986, Reinhart and Reuland 1993, Lidz and Idsardi 1997, Lidz 1998, 2003), we infer that the anaphor-antecedent chain in (18) is ill-formed. By creating an A-chain that crosses an argument NP, minimality is violated. The anaphor-antecedent chain in (19), on the other hand, is well-formed, apparently because the dative anaphor adjoins to the same node that the accusative argument is attached to. The chain <subj, self\(_{\text{DAT}}\)> is well-formed because there are no arguments intervening between these links. Similarly, the chain <self\(_{\text{DAT}}\), t\(_{\text{DAT}}\)> is well-formed because this chain does not *cross* the accusative DP. That is, the dative argument is adjoined to VP where it and the accusative DP are equidistant from the trace of the dative (May 1985, Chomsky 1986). In short, the obligatory dative-accusative order in reflexives follows from minimality considerations. The dative has to raise in order to avoid violating relativized minimality (Rizzi 1990). This locality property of anaphora chains will ultimately, in section 7, play a large role in explaining the incompatibility of reflexive and benefactive structures.

5. **VRM**

Although the theory of VRM plays only a small role in this paper, it is important to specify precisely what this theory is. Descriptively speaking, VRM occurs on reflexive clauses (20) and also on certain anticausatives, such as (21).

(20) a. Hari tann-annu hogaLi-koLL-utt-aane
    Hari self-ACC praise-VRM-NPST-3SM
    ‘Hari praises himself.’

    b. * Hari tann-annu hogaL-utt-aane
       Hari self-ACC praise-NPST-3SM
(21) a. gaali-ge baagilu tere-du-koND-itu
    wind-DAT door open-PP-VRM.PST-3SN
    ‘Because of the wind, the door opened’

    b. (*gaali-ge) baagil-u terey-i-tu
       (*wind-DAT) door-NOM open-PST-3SN

When VRM occurs on anticausatives, it implies that the event had an external agent, even though no agent DP is present. Following this lead, Lidz (1998, 2003) proposes that VRM is licensed just when there is no DP in the specifier of agentive little-v, as indicated in (22) (cf. Embick 1998).

(22) VRM ↔ there is no DP in a specifier of vP.

Reflexives are assimilated to this case through the theory of chain-formation. In effect, only the head and tail of an A-chain are visible to the morphological component. Consequently, when a raised subject is linked by chain to an anaphor, the trace of the subject in [spec, vP] is deleted, as in (23b).

(23) a. \([_{\text{TP}} \text{hari} \left[_{\text{VP}} \text{hari} \left[_{\text{VP}} \text{ saw rashmi} \right] \right] \] Chain: \(<\text{hari, hari}>\)

    b. \([_{\text{TP}} \text{hari} \left[_{\text{VP}} \text{ saw himself} \right] \] Chain \(<\text{hari, himself}>\)

[Spec, vP] is therefore empty, and VRM is licensed. This theory has been defended extensively in Lidz 1998, 2003 and interested readers are referred to these papers.

6. C-locality and the licensing of DPs

In Lidz and Williams 2002, we introduced the relation of c-locality in (24).

(24) Y is c-local to X iff
       i) Y c-commands X
       ii) Every Z, such that Z c-commands X, and Z does not c-command Y, is a function over its sister.

C-locality can be understood in terms of function composability. When X is c-local to Y, then what intervenes between X and Y is a cascade of composable functions. The nodes c-commanding X, up to Y, are functions that could be composed, in consecutive hierarchical order, to form a single complex function over X.4

To get a feel for where c-locality will and will not obtain, compare the two trees in (25), where each node is paired with its semantic type. Arrows point from functions that c-command A to their arguments, and dotted lines connect functions that are composable.

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4 F can compose with G iff the range of G is the domain of F. By definition: COMPOSE (f,g) = \(\lambda x. f(g(x))\).
The two trees differ just in the types of the nodes F and D. F is a function over its sister in (25a) but not in (25b). In (25b), F is an argument of its sister, owing to the fact that D here is a two-place predicate.

As a result, node A enjoys broader c-locality relations in (25a) than in (25b). Every node that c-commands A in (25a) is a function over its sister, hence here A is c-local to all its c-commanders. This is not true in (25b). Here A is again c-local to B, D and F; but then c-locality is interrupted by F. Node A is not c-local to anything above F, i.e., it is not c-local to H, since F is not a function over its sister.

We use c-locality to define the domain of in situ Case licensing. We assume that Case is licensed in situ by the AGREE relation, which operates only over a c-local domain, as in (26):

(26) Case by AGREE: X has Case in its base position iff X is c-local to a head Y and Y assigns Case.

Assuming that agentive little-v (v_{AG}) assigns accusative Case (Chomsky 1995), accusative case is licensed in situ just when the object DP is c-local to v_{AG}. DPs that are not c-local to v_{AG} are not licensed in situ, and must instead move to a specifier of a case assigning head (27).

(27) Case by MOVE: X has Case if X is in a specifier of Y and Y assigns Case.

This movement is subject to Last Resort (Chomsky 1995), stated in (28), which permits Case-driven movement only for those DPs that would not have Case in situ. Importantly, we assume that A-movement is not bounded by c-locality, but rather by familiar conditions on A-movement, which are slightly looser.

(28) Last Resort: X moves to check a feature iff failure to move would leave the feature unchecked.

6.1 Motivations for c-locality

The relation of c-locality provides a natural way to link syntactic licensing to the elementary relation of function to argument, even in a theory where objects are syntactically licensed not by their verb, but by some higher functional head. The original motivation for this relation, however, was not conceptual but empirical. In Lidz and Williams 2002,
we showed that c-locality makes exactly the right distinction between resultatives and other constructions which are superficially similar. In particular, we showed that c-locality distinguishes resultatives from simple causatives and ECM constructions with respect to VRM. While VRM is possible in simple causatives and ECM constructions, it is not possible in reflexive resultatives:

(29) a. Hari tann-annu chappatey-isi-koND-a
    Hari self-ACC flat-CAUS-VRM.PST-3SM
    ‘Hari flattened himself.’

b. Hari tann-annu puNyavantanendu nambi-koLL-utt-aane
    Hari self-ACC wealthy believe-VRM-NPST-3SM
    ‘Hari believes himself to be wealthy.’

c. * Hari tann-annu chappatey-aagi taTTi-koND-a
    Hari self-ACC flat-ADVL hammer-VRM.PST-3SM
    Intended: ‘Hari hammered himself flat.’

d. Hari tann-annu chappatey-aagi taTT-id-a
    Hari self-ACC flat-ADVL hammer-PST-3SM
    ‘Hari hammered himself flat.’

We argued that this difference follows directly from the theory of Case just described, in which in situ case-licensing is possible only when the DP is c-local to its Case assigner. In simple causatives and ECM constructions, the accusative DP is c-local to its Case assigner, as illustrated in (30), where arrows point from functions that c-command the object DP to their arguments:5

(30) a. causative:

```
   vP
     / \
    /   \v'
  DP   CausP
     /   /
    /     Caus
   /       X
  Hari  -> XP
downside
flat    himself
```

b. ECM

```
   vP
     / \
    /   \v'
  DP   VP
     /   /
    /     X
  Hari  -> XP

downside
considers
downside
wealthy
```

5 Here we take \( v_{AG} \) to denote a function over its sister: \( \lambda e.\lambda x.e.[AG(e)=x & P(e)] \). Adopting the more conventional view—that \( v_{AG} \) combines with VP by “Event Identification” (Kratzer 1996), rather than Function Application—would have no effect on the present discussion.
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c. Resultatives

What distinguishes the object in (30c) from the objects in (30a-b) is c-locality. Whereas the DP objects in (30a-b) are c-local to $v_{AG}$, and so can get case in situ, the DP object in (30c) is not c-local to $v_{AG}$ because the means predicate, hammer, is not a function over its sister. It is an argument of Caus’, rather, since Caus denotes a two-place relation between the means and result predicates. Failure of c-locality forces this DP to raise in order to get Case. Now, given that VRM is licensed only when $[\text{spec, vP}]$ is empty and given that raising of an object DP is forced in a resultative, it follows that VRM could never be licensed in a reflexive resultative. In order to check its Case feature, the reflexive object necessarily raises to $[\text{spec, vP}]$, bleeding the environment for the insertion of VRM in $v$. See Lidz and Williams 2002 for further detail.

7. Putting it all together

We are now in a position to answer the question of why reflexive benefactives are impossible. Recall that benefactives have the structure in (31).

Here, the dative argument is introduced below $v_{AG}$ but above the accusative argument. The dative c-commands the accusative but is not a function over its sister. Consequently, the accusative is not c-local to $v_{AG}$, its licenser, and so must move to $[\text{spec, vP}]$ for Case, as in (32).
One consequence of this movement is that VRM will not be licensed, because \[ \text{spec, vP} \] is now filled. So we can conclude that a benefactive structure could not possibly be morphologically marked with VRM. Yet what we learned above is not just that VRM is morphologically impossible in a benefactive but, more strictly, that local anaphora is incompatible with a benefactive structure.

This incompatibility also follows from the derivation in (31-32). Raising the direct object to \[ \text{spec, vP} \] for Case creates precisely the configuration that, as we learned in section 4, makes the anaphora chain ill-formed. When the accusative argument raises, it interrupts the chain between the dative anaphor and its subject antecedent. As we saw with regard to examples (17a-b), we know that no DP can intervene between an anaphor and a clausemate antecedent without creating a minimality violating configuration (compare (32) to (18)). Thus, the requirement that the direct object receive Case by movement, a consequence of c-locality, cannot be satisfied if the indirect object is an anaphor. Movement for Case creates a minimality-violating configuration for the anaphor. In essence, reflexive benefactives are ungrammatical for precisely the same reason that a dative anaphor must precede the accusative argument in a nonbenefactive ditransitive.

8. Conclusions

Finally, then, we have solved the complementarity puzzle. A reflexive benefactive structure is subject to two requirements that cannot be met at the same time. A dative anaphor must be able to form a minimal chain with its antecedent in subject position. But because of the c-locality condition on \textit{in situ} Case assignment, the accusative argument, which originates below the dative, must raise in order to get Case. This raising induces a minimality violation in the anaphora chain. Thus, no benefactive structure with a dative anaphor can be derived. The complementarity between reflexive and benefactive morphology is simply a reflection of the fact that reflexive benefactives are undervariable.

More generally, the analysis presented here provides further support for the framework of locality and Case developed in Lidz and Williams 2002. The licensing of DPs \textit{in situ} is constrained by the c-locality relation, which is defined not strictly in syntactic terms but rather on the basis of function-argument relations. The link this theory posits between the function-argument relation and syntactic licensing is its central attraction. At the same time, it poses a clear challenge to the strict modularity of syntax and semantics often assumed in generative syntax.

9. Residual complications

In this section, we consider two potential problems with the proposed (non)derivations of reflexive ditransitives. We show however that these are only apparent problems, leaving our analysis unaffected.

First, our explanation of the impossibility of reflexive benefactives was based on the observation that the derivation (31-32) is impossible. This derivation fails due to the ill-formedness of the anaphora chain in (32), which is analogous to that in (18). But recall that (18) was saved by further movement of the anaphor, as in (19). This raises the question of whether the minimality violation in (32) could be averted by moving the dative
anaphor past the raised direct object, yielding (33). This derivation would yield a structure in which the anaphor is local to its binder, and there is no VRM because [spec, vP] is filled. In this structure, the direct object would receive Case by movement, as before, but the minimality violation in (32) would be averted by moving the anaphor into the same domain as the raised object.

(33)

We suggest that this derivation is problematic because the subject starts out in [spec, vP], as shown in (34). Moving the anaphor, as proposed in (33/34), would therefore involve moving the anaphor past the trace of its antecedent, the subject. This move creates an environment of “Lethal Ambiguity” (McGinnis, to appear), essentially a violation of Rizzi’s (1986) Chain Condition, and the derivation is ruled out. Thus, the minimality violation in (32) cannot be averted by subsequent movement of the anaphor, as this movement is also blocked.6 So our conclusion remains safe: a reflexive benefactive has no grammatical derivation.

(34)

A second potential concern centers on the question of what counts as an intervener for the c-locality relation in an adjunction structure. Recall that to derive the obligatory dative-accusative word-order in reflexive (nonbenefactive) ditransitives, like (17a), we

6 It is not difficult to think of cases of anaphors raising past (traces of) their antecedents, as in (i):

(i) Himself, John seems to like; but his wife, he clearly doesn’t.

Such examples, however, involve topicalization, which, unlike the movement proposed here, is A-bar movement, and is therefore expected to show different properties. Moreover, the problem with (34) is not just moving the anaphor past the trace of its antecedent, but into the same XP. Thus, any other examples of anaphors raising past (traces of) their antecedents would have to be examined closely to determine whether they represent actual counterexamples to the claims made here.
required the dative anaphor to adjoin to VP in order to avert a potential minimality violation, as in (19), repeated here as (35). One might suppose that this adjunction would therefore disrupt the c-locality relation between \( v_{AG} \) and the accusative DO, forcing movement of the DO to [spec, \( vP \)], and thus—so it may seem—inducing a new minimality violation.

\[(35)\]

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{subj} \\
vP \\
\text{self}_{\text{DAT}} \\
\text{DO}_{\text{ACC}} \\
t_{\text{DAT}} \\
V'
\end{array}
\]

But this worry is dispelled by attention to our definition of c-locality, repeated here.

\[(36)\] \( Y \) is c-local to \( X \) iff

i) \( Y \) c-commands \( X \)

ii) Every \( Z \), such that \( Z \) c-commands \( X \) and \( Z \) does not c-command \( Y \), is a function over its sister.

Crucially, \( Z \) is an intervener only if it does not c-command the higher element in the c-locality relation. That is, if \( Y \) and \( Z \) in (36) are in a mutual c-command relation, then \( Z \) does not intervene between \( Y \) and other things that \( Y \) c-commands (cf. May 1985, Chomsky 1986, Frank and Vijayshanker 2001, Bobaljik 2002). In the structure in (35), the first branching node dominating the dative argument is \( v' \) (only one segment of VP dominates the dative and so VP does not dominate it). Consequently \( v_{AG} \) and the dative argument are in a mutual c-command relation and so the latter does not intervene between \( v_{AG} \) and the direct object. Thus, \( v_{AG} \) is c-local to the direct object, and the direct object can therefore check Case \textit{in situ}.

**References**


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Pennsylvania.

Jeffrey Lidz  
Northwestern University  
Department of Linguistics  
2016 Sheridan Rd  
Evanston, IL 60208

jlidz@northwestern.edu

Alexander Williams  
University of Pennsylvania  
Department of Linguistics  
619 Williams Hall  
Philadelphia, PA 19104

alexand3@ling.upenn.edu