Simplex Sentences, Governing Categories (and Phases?)

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(1) Lees and Klima (1963):

A. Reflexive Rule

\[ X - \text{Nom} - Y - \text{Nom}' - Z \rightarrow X - \text{Nom} - Y - \text{Nom}' + \text{Self} - Z \]

where \( \text{Nom} = \text{Nom}' \) is a nominal, and where \( \text{Nom} \) and \( \text{Nom}' \) are within the same simplex sentence

B. Pronoun Rule

\[ X - \text{Nom} - Y - \text{Nom}' - Z \rightarrow X - \text{Nom} - Y - \text{Nom}' + \text{Pron} - Z \]

where \( \text{Nom} = \text{Nom}' \), and where \( \text{Nom} \) is in a matrix sentence while \( \text{Nom}' \) is in a constituent sentence embedded within that matrix sentence

(2)a I see myself
b *I see me

(3)a I told John to protect me
b *I told John to protect myself

(4) Reciprocal Rule

\[ X - N+\text{Pl} - Y - N'+\text{Pl} - Z \rightarrow X - N+\text{Pl} - Y - N'+\text{Pl} + \text{Recip} - Z \]

where \( N = N' \) and they are within the same simplex, and where \( N \) is a noun, \( \text{Pl} \) is the plural morpheme, and \( \text{Recip} \) is the reciprocal morpheme

(5) John and Mary frighten one another

(6)a *They forced the king to help one another
b *They forced the king to help themselves

(7)a *I like us
b *We like me Postal (1966)

(8) The Inclusion Constraint (TIC) Postal (1969)

(9)a *We were proud of me
b *John and I were proud of me

(10)a *Max and Mary criticized her
b *Max criticized Mary and him
b *Max and I criticized me Grinder and Postal (1971)

(11)a I think we will win
b We think I will win
b Max and Mary think she will win

(12) TIC is defined over "Clause Mates". Grinder and Postal (1971)
(13) "It is apparent ... that TIC is a restriction on the possible syntactic reflection of certain Semantic Representations. It is not a constraint on the well-formedness of Semantic Representations per se. This is particularly clear in cases like the following, where the Clause Mate structure over which TIC is defined is a result of transformational operations, in this case the rule RAISING:"

(14)a Joe believes that we are under surveillance by the FBI
    b *Joe believes us to be under surveillance by the FBI

(15)a We believe that I am under surveillance by the FBI
    b *We believe me to be under surveillance by the FBI

(16) Chomsky (1973) brought a new perspective to such phenomena, arguing that the relevant structural issue is not whether there is a clause boundary separating the two NPs, but rather what sort of clause boundary there is. An infinitival clause boundary is in the pertinent sense weaker than a finite clause boundary. This was the Tensed Sentence Condition (TSC).

(17) **Tensed Sentence Condition** (1st version)
    No rule can involve X, Y in the structure
    ...X...[α...Y...]
    where α is a tensed sentence

(18) But access for reflexivization or reciprocal to non-subjects of non-finite clauses is also barred, as seen in (3)b, (3)a and (6)a. Hence,

(19) **Specified Subject Condition** (1st version)
    No rule can involve X, Y in the structure
    ...X...[α...Z...-WYV...]
    where Z is the specified subject of WYV in α

(20) RI: "a rule of interpretation applying to the structure NP-V-NP (among other) [that] seeks to interpret the two NPs as nonintersecting in reference, and where this is impossible...it assigns 'strangeness'. cf. Postal's "Unlike Person Constraint" [[Actually, Inclusion Constraint]].

(21) "...under the analysis proposed here there is no necessity for a rule raising the subject of an embedded sentence to the object position of the matrix sentence..."

**DIGRESSION**

"Notice that one rule that obviously does not satisfy the condition is Coreference Assignment (however it is formulated). Thus the pronoun can be anaphoric in *John said that he would leave*, for example. The same rule also applies within coordinate structures (for example, *John said that he and Bill would leave*) and others that block various types of rules."

This apparent exception might not be a real one. Lasnik (1976) argues that there is no rule of coreference assignment responsible for the coreferential interpretation of
pronouns in examples of this sort (sometimes misleadingly called "accidental coreference"). However, while no sentence-grammar rule of coreference will be involved in the interpretation of pronouns, given the approach of Lasnik (1976), there is, crucially, a sentence-grammar rule of non-coreference (or, more generally, disjoint reference) involved in the analysis presented. Consider (22):

(22) He thought that John would win

The rule implicated in (22), whose semantic effects are very similar to those of RI, clearly does not conform to the two constraints, as is immediately evident in (22) and (23):

(23) He believes Mary to like John

Further, Lasnik (1976) explicitly rejects an accidental coreference account of pronouns as bound variables. These must be genuine instances of binding. However, here too, we find flagrant violations of the conditions:

(24) Everyone thought he would win
(25) Everyone believes Mary to like him

END OF DIGRESSION

(26) Chomsky (1981) (LGB) presents a greatly modified theory of anaphora, but one which substantially maintains the local domain specification:

(27) $\alpha$ is bound by $\beta$ if and only if $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are coindexed and $\beta$ c-commands $\alpha$.
(28) $\alpha$ is free if and only if it is not bound.

(29) A An anaphor is (A-)bound in its governing category (GC).
    B A pronominal is (A-)free in its GC.
    C An R-expression (fully lexical NP, or variable) is (A-) free.

(30) $\alpha$ is a governing category for $\beta$ if and only if $\alpha$ is the minimal category containing $\beta$, a governor of $\beta$, and a SUBJECT accessible to $\beta$.
(31) SUBJECT = AGR in a finite clause; NP of S in an infinitival; NP of NP in an NP.

(32) Chomsky actually argues that the LGB formulation solves a problem of his earlier characterizations of the domain (Chomsky (1973), Chomsky (1976), Chomsky (1980)); namely that there are two unrelated configurations that are relevant. However that disjunction largely persists, in the disjunctive definition of SUBJECT.

(33) So ... clause-mate or GC?
(34) Even Chomsky (1981) occasionally makes reference to clause-mate:
(35) they are likely [t' to appear to each other [t to be happy]]
(36) "The GF- $\theta$ filled by medial traces such as t' in [(35)] may ... be relevant to LF; for example in the sentence [(35)], ... where the medial trace serves as the antecedent of each other, which requires an antecedent in the same clause in such sentences in accordance with binding theory ..."  Chomsky (1981, pp.44-45)
Interestingly, it actually isn't completely clear that the antecedent must be in the same clause, given the binding theory in Chomsky (1981), or those in Chomsky (1973) and Chomsky (1986) for that matter. It all depends on whether there is a subject position in the intermediate clause.

So ... clause-mate or GC? A fascinating ECM construction investigated by Kayne (1985), Johnson (1991), and Koizumi (1995) provides the basis for a new argument.

Mary made out that John is a fool
Mary made John out to be a fool
Mary made out John to be a fool [Good for some speakers]

a Jack made himself out to be immoral
b*Jack made out himself to be immoral [Bad for all speakers, as far as I know]

They made each other out to be honest
b*They made out each other to be honest [Bad for all speakers, as far as I know]

GC can't handle this, but clause-mate can, if we assume some version of subject raising.

Interfering, but not devastatingly so, factor:
?Jack called up himself
?They called up each other

*John, injured him,
*John, believes him, to be a genius
Why can't the embedded subject remain in the lower clause here?

Weak object pronouns must cliticize onto the verb. Oehrle (1976)
The detective brought him in
*The detective brought in him Chomsky (1955)

Potential supporting evidence for this line of analysis:
*Mary injured him, and John, did too
?Mary believes him, to be a genius and John, does too

How can VP deletion (arguably a PF process) repair a (presumably LF) Condition B violation?

Suppose Postal (1966), Postal (1974) was right (contra Chomsky (1973)) that the relevant structural configuration for such obviation is based on the notion clause-mate. (For related discussion, see Lasnik (2002))

Failure to cliticize in (56) is repaired by ellipsis.
In (55), on the other hand, the pronoun and its antecedents are clause-mates independent of cliticization.
Potential problem, pointed out by Tom Roeper: In just those VP ellipsis situations where Condition B effects are ameliorated, so are Condition C effects. But this is unexpected since Condition C involves no locality, clause-mate or otherwise. A relevant example, parallel to (56) above, is the following:

(62) ??Mary believes John, to be a genius and he, does too

Compare:

(63) *He, believes John, to be a genius

(64) And even though Condition C involves no locality, once again, we find amelioration only in non-local domain:

(65)a *Mary injured John, and he, did too

b *He, injured John,

(66) Perhaps this is not really so surprising, as Condition C effects often disappear under ellipsis. Another example is:

(67)a Mary thinks John, is a genius and he, does too

b *He, thinks John, is a genius

(68) It was facts like this that provided much of the motivation for the 'Vehicle Change' of Fiengo and May (1994). Fiengo and May show how + and − pronominal correlates can be equated for the purposes of ellipsis. Thus a name [-a, − p] and corresponding pronoun [-a, +p] count as identical. Fiengo and May's treatment is in terms of an LF copying theory of ellipsis, but nothing crucial changes if the equivalence is stated in terms of identity deletion.

(69) We now have a handle on the parallelism between Condition B and apparent Condition C in ellipsis contexts - (56) vs. (61). Even in the latter circumstance, the subject of the infinitival clause could actually be the pronoun him. The two examples then become identical for our purposes: it is failure of him to cliticize that is remediated by deletion.

(70) There are contexts where pronouns are disallowed, yet we still get apparent Condition C amelioration (a phenomenon noticed by Christopher Potts, and brought to my attention by Jason Merchant). The following is an example (though not of precisely a type discussed by Potts).

(71) *He, said that I should show Susan John,

(72) Mary said that I should show Susan John, but he didn't say that I should show Susan John/him

(73) *(He didn't say that) I should show Susan him

(74) Potts's point was that vehicle change won't account for the Condition C amelioration this time, since a pronoun in place of the name is still bad (though for other reasons).
In this instance, the other reasons could be exactly what I appealed to earlier - the clitic
nature of weak accusative pronouns. In that case, vehicle change would give the desired
result.

(76) (72) then violates this PF requirement, and VP ellipsis deletes the PF violation.

Mary showed Susan Bill, even though he, didn't want her to.

(77) (Jason Merchant, attributed to Chris Potts)

*He, didn't want Mary to show Susan Bill,

*He didn't want Mary to show Susan him

*Mary showed Susan him

(81) So 'simplex sentence' is descriptively superior to 'governing category' or Tensed Sentence
Condition plus Specified Subject Condition. Should this be a cause for alarm in
minimalist circles? Maybe not, as simplex sentence seems at least as natural a notion as
GC.

(82) Can we do better still, by replacing simplex sentence with 'phase' (assuming we can come
up with exactly the right characterization of phase)?

(83) Perhaps an anaphor must find a phase-mate antecedent, because at the end of the phase
containing the anaphor, it's too late, that portion of the structure being 'shipped off' for
interpretation, and its an inherent property of an anaphor that it have an antecedent.

(84) The phenomenon of Condition B type obviation remains somewhat mysterious in terms
of Minimalism, but if it is restricted to the phase, the local domain part of it is again
rather natural

(85) BUT a huge problem remains: A strong enough version of phase theory retains the
difficulty of the 1973 Conditions with respect to the situations mentioned above where
the relevant relations are completely unbounded:

*He, thought that John, would win

*He believes Mary to like John

Everyone, thought he, would win

Everyone, believes Mary to like him,
References


