Some Milestones in the Development of Binding Theory

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The original theories of anaphoric relations were transformational. Anaphoric pronouns were derived from full NPs; reflexives were derived from pronouns, as were missing subjects of certain infinitivals (EQUI).

(1) "... there are actually good reasons for introducing [pronouns] transformationally as substituends for NP's of the proper kind... [a] transformation ... replaces an animate NP by "he."" Chomsky (1955, p.502)

(2) "In §109.6 we found that such sentences as "John wanted him to come" (= 311) are introduced by transformation. If we investigate these sentences in more detail, we discover that there are certain restrictions on the occurrence of pronouns. Alongside of 311 we have 325 but not 326:

325  (a) I wanted him to try
    (b) I wanted you to try
    (c) I wanted to try
326  I wanted me to try

The only way to avoid a special restricting statement on the level P is to add a mapping $\Phi_x^p$ that carries 326 into 325c:

327  $\Phi_x^p$ carries $I$-want-$I$-to $\text{try}$ into $I$-want-$to$ $\text{try}$" LSLT p.519

(3) *You wanted you to try

Third person is slightly trickier:

(4) 328  (a) he wanted him to try
    (b) he wanted to try

The simplest way to handle this situation appears to be to set up two distinct elements he and he* corresponding to the element he" of W, he being an element just like I and you (which accounts for 328b), and he* being an ordinary proper noun (which accounts for 328a, just as we have "he wanted John to try"). The establishment of this pair of homonyms on the level P is further supported by its usefulness for other purposes, as we will see below. We thus replace 327 by the more general characterization

329  $\Phi_x^p$ carries $\begin{cases} I \\ you \\ he \end{cases}$ -want- $\begin{cases} I \\ you \\ he \end{cases}$ -to $\text{try}$ into $\begin{cases} I \\ you \\ he \end{cases}$ -want - to $\text{try}$

Thus, bound anaphoric and freely referring ones are different lexical items. For instance, (5) is ambiguous, rather than vague.
(5) John thinks he is clever

(6) The setting up of two elements he and he* also has support in the referential use of these words. Whereas I and you have an unambiguous reference in sentences like "John said that I would come," "John said that you would come," in "John said that he would come" the reference is ambiguous. In our terms, if "he" in this sentence is derived from the syntactic element he (the pronoun), the reference is to John, as it is in 330b, where he becomes Ø; if it is derived from the syntactic element he* (the proper noun), the reference is to a second person, as in 330a. While the results of our grammatical analysis naturally tell us nothing about reference, this syntactic discussion does provide the means for an adequate description of reference in some semantic description of English. p.525

(7) We also have

330  (a) John wanted him to try
    (b) John wanted to try
    (c) John wanted me to try

The simplest way to account for this is to revise $\Phi^p_x$, replacing 329 by

331 $\Phi^p_x$ carries

\[
\begin{cases}
I & \\
\text{you} & \text{I}
\end{cases}
\begin{cases}
-I & \\
\text{he} & \text{you}
\end{cases}
\text{-to-try - into}

\begin{cases}
\text{I} & \\
\text{you} & \text{I}
\end{cases}
\begin{cases}
\text{-want-to-try} & \text{} (NP_y \neq I, you)
\end{cases}
\]

$\Phi^p_x$ applied to "John wanted him* to try" gives 330a; i.e., it does not apply. Applied to "John wanted him to try," $\Phi^p_x$ gives 330b. pp.519-520

What about reflexives?

(8) $T_{self}$ as we have stated it is only a special case of a quite general transformation. Note that "him," "you," etc. in 351 are each the object of the complex verb "persuade-to try" (an instance of Verb-Complement). But it is true in general that the object of a verb undergoes the transformation $T_{self}$ even in kernel sentences. Thus we have

355 he saw himself, etc.

The transformation $T_{self}$ must be reformulated, then, to hold more generally of NP-Verb-NP, and it must be given as a mapping, since it is obligatory even for kernel sentences. We replace 352 by 356, defining the component $\Phi^p_0$ of $\Phi^p$.
\( \Phi^p_x \) is determined by \((Q_{self}, \delta_{self})\), where

\[
Q_{self} = \left\{ \left( \left\{ \begin{array}{c}
you \\
NP
\end{array} \right\} \right) \right. \\
\left. \left( \left( I \right) \right) \right. \\
\left. \left(VP_1 \sim V_T, \left\{ \begin{array}{c}
you \\
he
\end{array} \right\} \right) \right) \right\}
\]

\( \delta_{self} \sim (U, U, U, self) \)

Locality of the 'clause-mate' type was also first hinted at in LSLT:

(9) The investigation of "self" and its distribution will, I think, turn out to be of some importance for the study of transformational structure. The occurrence in a sentence of \( X-self \), for some pronoun \( X \), indicates a special relation between this element and some noun or some other pronoun in the sentence. To give a general rule concerning all such cases directly for all sentences may be quite difficult. But we may be able to show that whenever this relation exists between two positions in a complex sentence \( Z \), the elements filling these places have some fixed relation in the kernel structures from which \( Z \) is derived (e.g., they may be subject and object). If so, the distribution of \( self \) may be statable simply in terms of this kernel sentence relation. The simplification thus introduced can be an important support for transformational analysis, in particular cases.

Chomsky (1965) has interesting discussion of reflexivization, referencing Lees and Klima (1963). In this discussion, referential indices are introduced as part of the theory, to further explicate the notion of 'identity' relevant to deletion operations (of which pronominalization and reflexivization are two):

(10) "As an additional illustration, consider the reflexivization operation (see Lees and Klima, 1963, for a detailed discussion). It has frequently been observed that in a sentence such as "John hurt John" or "the boy hurt the boy," the two phonetically identical Noun Phrases are necessarily interpreted as differing in reference; sameness of reference requires reflexivization of the second Noun Phrase (this is also true of pronominalization). Various attempts have been made to build an account of this into the syntactic component, but none has been very convincing. The availability of lexical features suggests a new approach that might be explored. Suppose that certain lexical items are designated as "referential" and that by a general convention, each occurrence of a referential item is assigned a marker, say, an integer, as a feature. The reflexivization rule can be formulated as an erasure operation that uses one Noun Phrase to delete
another. As in the case of relativization ... the erasure leaves a residue, in particular, the feature \([\pm \text{Human}]\) and it introduces the new phonetic element \textit{self}. Thus when applied to "I hurt I," the first Noun Phrase is used to delete the second, finally giving, "I hurt myself." But by the recoverability condition on deletion, the reflexivization rule (similarly, the pronominalization rule) will apply only when the integers assigned to the two items are the same." pp.145-146

(11) "The semantic component will then interpret two referential items as having the same reference just in case they are strictly identical - in particular, in case they have been assigned the same integer in the deep structure. This gives the right answer in many cases, but there are interesting problems that arise when the referential items are plural, and of course there are problems in specifying the notion "referential" properly." p.146

Clause-mate was the standard locality configuration for the first couple of generations:

(12) Lees and Klima (1963):
   A. Reflexive Rule
   \[ X - \text{Nom} - Y -\text{Nom}' - Z \rightarrow X - \text{Nom} - Y -\text{Nom}' + \text{Self} - Z \]
   where \text{Nom} = \text{Nom}' = \text{a nominal, and where Nom and Nom}' are within the same simplex sentence
   B. Pronoun Rule
   \[ X - \text{Nom} - Y -\text{Nom}' - Z \rightarrow X - \text{Nom} - Y -\text{Nom}' + \text{Pron} - Z \]
   where \text{Nom} = \text{Nom}', and where \text{Nom} is in a matrix sentence while \text{Nom}' is in a constituent sentence embedded within that matrix sentence

(13)a I see myself
    b *I see me
(14)a I told John to protect me
    b *I told John to protect myself

(15) Reciprocal Rule
   \[ X - N + P_l - Y -N' + P_l - Z \rightarrow X - N + P_l - Y -N' + P_l + \text{Recip} - Z \]
   where \(N = N'\) and they are within the same simplex, and where \(N\) is a noun, \(P_l\) is the plural morpheme, and \(\text{Recip}\) is the reciprocal morpheme

(16) John and Mary frighten one another
(17)a *They forced the king to help one another
    b *They forced the king to help themselves

Chomsky (1965) alluded to problems with plurals. Some of the problems raised by plurals are first discussed by Postal (1966):
(18)  a. *I like us
    b. *We like me
(19)  The Inclusion Constraint (TIC)  Postal (1969)
(20)  a. *We were proud of me
    b. *John and I were proud of me
(21)  a. *Max and Mary, criticized her
    b. *Max, criticized Mary and him
    c. *Max and I criticized me
(22)  a. I think we will win
    b. We think I will win
    c. Max and Mary think she will win
(23)  TIC is defined over "Clause Mates".  Grinder and Postal (1971)
(24)  "It is apparent ... that TIC is a restriction on the possible syntactic reflection of certain Semantic Representations. It is not a constraint on the well-formedness of Semantic Representations per se. This is particularly clear in cases like the following, where the Clause Mate structure over which TIC is defined is a result of transformational operations, in this case the rule RAISING:"
(25)  a. Joe, believes that we, are under surveillance by the FBI
    b. *Joe, believes us, to be under surveillance by the FBI
(26)  a. We believe that I am under surveillance by the FBI
    b. *We believe me to be under surveillance by the FBI

The Chomsky (1965) take on reflexivization and clause-mates:
(27)  "Notice, incidentally, that the reflexivization rule does not always apply (though pronominalization does) even when the two Nouns are strictly identical and hence coreferential. Thus we have "I kept it near me" alongside of "I aimed it at myself," and so on. The difference is that in the first, but not the second, the repeated Noun is in a Sentence-Complement to the Verb. Thus "I kept it near me" has a deep structure of the form "I - kept - it - # S #," where S dominates "it is near me." But "I aimed it at myself" has a deep structure of the form "I - aimed - it - at me" (there is no underlying sentence "it is at me"). The reflexivization rule does not apply to a repeated N dominated by an occurrence of S that does not dominate the "antecedent" occurrence of N."  p.146

The 'Insertion Prohibition'
(28)  "This particular remark about English is, apparently, a consequence of a more general condition
on transformations, namely that no morphological material (in this case, self) can be introduced into a configuration dominated by S once the cycle of transformational rules has already completed its application to this configuration (though items can still be extracted from this constituent of a larger "matrix structure," in the next cycle of transformational rules)." p.146

The introduction of command
Langacker (1969) explored the following question:

(29) "Under what circumstances can a definite noun phrase \( N_{Pa} \) be used to pronominalize an identical noun phrase \( N_{Pp} \)?" p.160

Interestingly, Langacker does not commit himself to a transformational approach:

(30) "The analysis to be proposed is essentially neutral with respect to various alternative ways of representing pronominalization in a generative grammar. For example, it makes no difference for our purposes whether pronominalization is effected by a single transformational rule or whether a series of operations is involved. Likewise, it makes no difference whether pronouns are derived by reducing fully specified underlying noun phrases or whether they are present in deep structure (although we will adopt the former alternative for purposes of exposition)." p.161

Langacker begins the discussion with an observation similar to the generalizations embodied in (12) above:

(31) "Reflexivization may be regarded as a special form of pronominalization, the form that occurs when \( N_{Pa} \) and \( N_{Pp} \) are constituents of the same simple sentence." p.162

First structural constraint on reflexivization:

(32) \( N_{Pp} \) cannot precede \( N_{Pa} \)

(33)a Those men outsmarted themselves
b *Themselves outsmarted those men
(34)a Penelope told Peter about himself
b *Penelope told himself about Peter

Langacker indicates that this precedence constraint ultimately follows from a more general constraint governing all types of pronominalization. More on this later.

Complementarity between pronouns and reflexives

(35) (12) simply stipulates the complementarity. The reflexivization and pronominalization transformations apply in complementary domains.
Langacker tries to do better:

"By ordering the obligatory reflexivization rule before the regular pronominalization rule, we avoid having to restrict pronominalization so that it cannot apply when $NP^e$ and $NP^o$ are in the same simple sentence." p.163

We need to block pronominalization from turning (38) into (39).

(38) **Those women** admire **those women**
(39) * **Those women** admire them

If reflexivization comes first, it obligatorily turns (38) into (40), so (39) can never arise.

(40) **Those women** admire **themselves**

However, "it seems best to consider reflexivization and pronominalization as two variants of the same process ... There are two reasons for this. First, the two operations are very similar, formally and intuitively. Second, the constraint we will formulate for pronominalization will serve without modification to rule out reflexive sentences such as [(33)b] and [(34)b]." p.163

A potential way to capture the complementarity without ordering two separate rules:

(42) "... reflexivization can be viewed as the result of regular pronominalization plus some other operation (such as self insertion)." p.163

Linear order also seems to be relevant when $NP^e$ and $NP^o$ are in separate clauses:

(43)a **Ralph** is much more intelligent than **he** looks  
   b **This woman** hates the man who wronged **her**  
   c I will give **these kittens** to the girl who wants **them**  
   d Tell **that man** that **he** can't go in there  
   e **The artist** who painted these pictures must work while **he** is sleeping

(44)a * **He** is much more intelligent than **Ralph** looks  
   b * **She** hates the man who wronged **this woman**  
   c * I will give **them** to the girl who wants **these kittens**  
   d * Tell **him** that **that man** can't go in there  
   e * **He** must work while **the artist who painted these pictures** is sleeping

However, sometimes a pronoun may precede its antecedent:

(45)a The woman who is to marry **him** will visit **Ralph** tomorrow  
   b The man who wronged **her** is hated by **this woman**  
   c The girl who wants **them** will receive **these kittens** as a present from me
"We might hypothesize ... that pronominalization is possible just in case \( NP^a \) is higher in the tree than \( NP^p \), meaning that \( NP^a \) is dominated by fewer S-nodes than \( NP^p \)." p.164

However, "there are cases where the pronoun is higher in the tree than its antecedent":

(47)a The woman who is to marry Ralph will visit him tomorrow
   b The man who wronged this woman is hated by her
   c The girl who wants these kittens will receive them as a present from me

"Therefore, neither a constraint based on linear ordering nor a constraint based on relative depth of embedding is sufficient to handle pronominalization ..." p.165

"At the same time, however, both of these factors seem to be pertinent in some way, which suggests that the restrictions on pronominalization can be stated when they are considered simultaneously."

Four possibilities for the interaction of the two factors:

(50) \( NP^a \) precedes \( NP^p \) and is higher in the tree than \( NP^p \):

\[
\begin{array}{c}
S \\
\downarrow \\
NP^a \quad S \\
\quad \downarrow \\
NP^p
\end{array}
\]

Ralph is much more intelligent than he looks

(51) \( NP^p \) precedes \( NP^a \) and is higher in the tree than \( NP^a \):

\[
\begin{array}{c}
S \\
\downarrow \\
NP^p \quad S \\
\quad \downarrow \\
NP^a
\end{array}
\]

*He is much more intelligent than Ralph looks
(52) \(NP^p\) precedes \(NP^o\) but \(NP^o\) is higher in the tree than \(NP^p\):
The woman who is to marry Ralph will visit him tomorrow

\[
\begin{array}{c}
S \\
S \quad NP^o \\
\quad NP^p
\end{array}
\]

(53) \(NP^o\) precedes \(NP^p\) but \(NP^p\) is higher in the tree than \(NP^o\):
The woman who is to marry him will visit Ralph tomorrow

\[
\begin{array}{c}
S \\
S \quad NP^p \\
\quad NP^o
\end{array}
\]

(54) "It would seem, then, that \(NP^p\) can be used to pronominalize \(NP^o\) unless \(NP^o\) both precedes \(NP^p\) and is in a higher echelon of embedding than \(NP^p\)." p.166

But "The constraint is too strong":

(55)a The girl who loved him thinks that the woman who killed Peter is a fink
   b After she left so hurriedly, it was discovered that Peter had insulted the man who was escorting the pretty blond

\[
\begin{array}{c}
S \\
S \quad S \\
NP^p \quad NP^o \\
\quad S
\end{array}
\]

(56) "In [(51)], the S-node that most directly dominates \(NP^p\) also dominates \(NP^o\). In [(55)], however, the S-node most directly dominating \(NP^p\) does not dominate \(NP^o\)." p.167

(57) "We will say that a node \(A\) 'commands' another node \(B\) if (1) neither \(A\) nor \(B\) dominates the other; and (2) the S-node that most immediately dominates \(A\) also dominates \(B\)."
NP\textsuperscript{p} may pronominalize NP\textsuperscript{p} unless (1) NP\textsuperscript{p} precedes NP\textsuperscript{p}; and (2) NP\textsuperscript{p} commands NP\textsuperscript{p}.

Langacker observes that the "constraint also works for reflexivization":

(59)a Those men outsmarted themselves  
b *Themselves outsmarted those men

(60) "[(59)b] is prevented because (1) NP\textsuperscript{p} (themselves) precedes NP\textsuperscript{p} (those men); and (2) NP\textsuperscript{p} commands NP\textsuperscript{p} (since the lowest S-node that dominates themselves also dominates those men). Thus the major constraint that must be imposed on reflexivization follows as a special case from the general restriction that must be imposed on pronominalization."

p.167

Early version of c-command - 'in construction with'

Klima (1964) proposed this notion in his investigations of scope of negation. Two classic early discussions of anaphora - Ross (1967a) and Langacker (1969) - both explicitly argued that this is the wrong relation for anaphora.

(61) Node A of a phrase-marker is in construction with node B  
if B is dominated by the node which immediately dominates A.

<This is Ross's presentation, also given by Langacker. Klima's itself was a bit confusingly stated, but as far as I can tell, it was actually the converse of (61). Following tradition, I will use (61).>

Ross observes that in construction with is stronger (i.e., more restrictive) than command.

(62)

(63) "... E, F, and G command S\textsubscript{2}, A, B, C, and D, but ... only E is in construction with these latter five nodes."    p.204

Ross's argument that in construction with is inappropriate for anaphora is based on (64).

(64) I talked to Winston about himself
The source of this would be (65).

(65) I talked to Winston about Winston
But while the first *Winston* commands the second, it is not in construction with it (because of the PP dominating the first *Winston*). <To this day, this remains a big problem in the theory of anaphora.>

Langacker's argument is that the major constraint on pronominalization cannot be correctly stated in terms of in construction with, but can in terms of command:

(66)a I knew Harvey when he was a little boy
    b *I knew him when Harvey was a little boy

(67)```
    S
     |
  NP   PdP
     |
  I   VP     Adv
     |
  V   NP when S
     |
 knew Harvey NP PdP
     |
 Harvey was a little boy
```

(68) "Since the second occurrence of *Harvey* in [(67)] follows the first but is not in construction with it, [(66)b] is allowed by [a constraint stated in terms of in construction with]. The first occurrence of *Harvey* both commands and precedes the second, however, so [(66)b] is excluded by the constraint we have adopted." p.175

**Command and clause-mates**

(69) "... if A were a member of a clause which did not contain B, then A would not command B, and conversely. To specify that two nodes command each other is to specify that each is dominated by the first node S above the other, and because of the formal properties of trees, these S nodes must be the same. That is, two nodes which command each other are in the same simplex sentence." p.203

(70) "... the English rule of Reflexivization ... can ... be formulated in terms of double command." pp.203-204
Rosenbaum (1965) examined infinitival complements with missing subjects as in (71).

(71)a  John condescended to go  
   b  John defied Bill to go

Rosenbaum is specifically concerned with the following:

(72)  ..."a sufficient condition for determining the deletion must specify which noun phrase in 
     the main sentence must be identical to the initial noun phrase of the complement in order 
     for the deletion to proceed."

(73)

(74)
Initial formulations of subject NP deletion rules for these two cases:

a. X NP₁ V [NP₂ VP]ₘ Y
   1  2  3  4  5  6  ⇒
   1  2  3 ⊙  5  6

b. X NP V NP₁ [NP₂ VP]ₘ Y
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  ⇒
   1  2  3  4 ⊙  6  7

In the theory of the time, these rules couldn't be collapsed. Thus, as Rosenbaum observes, a generalization is being missed. As Rosenbaum sees it, the difficulty concerns the choice of controller of the deletion, matrix subject in (75)a, matrix object in (75)b. If that can be factored out, the separate processes can be united.

"The generalization that determines which of the two noun phrases in the main sentence must be identical to the initial noun phrase of the complement can be expressed in terms of a principle of minimal distance (henceforth PMD). In the underlying phrase structure diagram [(74)], one observes that the noun phrase in the main sentence which is relevant, i.e., the object noun phrase, is also that noun phrase which is least distant from the initial noun phrase of the complement. Distance here naturally can be defined in terms of the underlying phrase structure itself by making reference to the number of branches in the path which separates the NP nodes in the main sentence from the initial NP node in the complement. Thus, for example, in diagram [(74)] the number of branches separating the subject noun phrase of the main sentence from the initial noun phrase of the complement is four. The number of branches separating the object noun phrase of the main sentence, the relevant noun phrase, from the initial noun phrase of the complement is three. The principle correctly predicts that the object noun phrase of the main sentence is the noun phrase which must be identical to the initial noun phrase of the complement. Sentence [(71)a] reveals a special case of the principle. In this instance, the subject noun phrase of the main sentence is the only noun phrase in the main sentence and is, therefore, the least distant from the initial noun phrase of the complement."

With PMD factored out, Rosenbaum states an EQUI rule covering both (75)a and b (and also covering backwards EQUI, which I have abstracted away from ("Seeing you there upset Bill"): 
Postal (1970) begins his discussion of EQUI with an observation important to the theory of anaphora more generally, that there are three different types of coreference manifestation:

(78) a Presupposed
    b Asserted
    c Inferred

(79) a Harry analyzed himself
    b The one who analyzed Harry was Jack
    c The boy looked at his male parent's only son

"The user of [(79)a] presupposes that the NP are coreferents and asserts a certain kind of relation between the tokens." p.440

"In [(79)b] the user asserts an identity of reference between the NP, which are not presupposed to be coreferential." p.440

"Presupposed coreference involves processes which partially determine the grammatical form of NP themselves. Assertive coreference does not. The NP in [(79)b] are not marked in any way which indicates that they are coreferential." p.440

The constraints and processes Postal discusses (and, in fact, the substance of all versions of BT) are properties specifically of presupposed coreference.

(80) a Harry wants __ to marry a millionaire
    b Harry expects __ to win the election
    c Harriet was unable __ to keep quiet
    d Lucille is anxious __ to become immortal
    e __ Finding out he had no liver didn't worry Flavnikoff
    f __ Persuading Abe __ to live in a cave was not easy for me

The standard theory of such constructions at the time was based on work by Rosenbaum (1965), Rosenbaum (1967). Rosenbaum had argued for a single uniform rule of deletion, one which came to be called EQUI-NP DELETION (EQUI for short).
The notion of coreference is tricky. It is not just, as Postal notes, that expressions like 'square circle' that don't refer in any possible world participate in it, but also that expressions that aren't even of the right type to be referential do also, as in Postal's ex.

(81) Few criminals like being caught

Postal argues that EQUI is (at least) a two part process, with the first part being pronominalization. He suggests a general principle from which this might follow:

(82) Universal Deletion Constraint
If a transformation T deletes an NP, subject to the existence of a coreferent NP, in the same structure, then at the point where T applies, NP must be pronominal. p.489

Postal's major argument that EQUI depends on pronominalization is parallelism of limitations on the two phenomena.

(83) "Certain otherwise ad hoc restrictions on EQUI are predictable from independently necessary constraints on PRONOMINALIZATION, if EQUI applies to structures only when they have already undergone PRONOMINALIZATION." p.458

(84) "... one can naturally think of deletion governed by coreference as equivalent to the existence of some general pronoun, call it Doom, which accidentally has the null phonological shape." p.458

(85) Doom's falling off the building injured Harry

"The general form of our arguments showing that EQUI is dependent on PRONOMINALIZATION is ... the demonstration that ... restrictions on the distribution of Doom follow from restrictions on the distribution of ordinary coreferential pronouns:

a. *Doomi ... A ... NP
b. *hisi ... A ... NP

Probably the most interesting argument is based on a phenomenon later called Weak Crossover. Postal attributes to S. Y. Kuroda the observation that backwards pronominalization is blocked in a class of case involving indefinite NP:

(86)a If the man, calls, you shouldn't talk to him
b If he, calls, you shouldn't talk to the man
(87)a If a (certain) man, calls, you shouldn't talk to him
b *If he, calls, you shouldn't talk to a (certain) man

To these, Postal adds

(88) *The fact that he lost amused somebody in the crowd
(89) *The man who lost it needs to find something
Postal then claims that this constraint is mirrored by EQUI structures:

(90)a  *Finding out Greta was a vampire worried somebody
       b  *Discovering that their daughters were pregnant worried some old ladies
       c  *Kissing was fun for some kids

<These data are controversial. Examples like these are often called good, part of a phenomenon called "PRO gate" by Higginbotham (1980). In a footnote, Postal acknowledges dialectal differences with respect to this patterning.>

More examples from Postal:

(91)a  *The woman who loved him impoverished every businessman
       b  Every businessman was impoverished by the woman who loved him
(92)a  *Finding that out worried each businessman
       b  *Discovering that God was dead upset every priest in the world
       c  *Falling off the building killed someone

Postal arrives at a multi-part analysis of EQUI, designed to capture the parallelism with pronominalization noted just above and to resolve a concomitant inconsistency with respect to cyclicity:

(93) First, Postal argues that pronominalization is postcyclical, because it must follow WH-movement, which, according to Postal is postcyclical.

(94)a  *He thinks Mary hates Bill
       b  The fact that he lost worried Bill
       c  *He visited some of the men who liked Bill
       d  Bill visited some of the men who liked him

(95)a  Which of the men who liked him did Bill visit
       b  Which of the men who liked Bill did he visit

(96) "Here, backwards pronominalization is possible out of the complex NP which has been fronted by WH Q MOVEMENT, just because this complex NP contains a subordinate clause in which the pronoun occurs. This follows from the general condition, if PRONOMINALIZATION is defined to apply after WH Q MOVEMENT. With the reverse ordering, however, the facts in sentences like [(95)] become exceptional, since the general condition predicts the illformedness of backwards pronominalization in structures like:

[(97)] Bill, visited wh some of the men who liked Bill," p.454

<In a slightly different guise - 'reconstruction' - this issue is still alive 3-1/2 decades later. Much more below.>
Now, Postal's argument that WH-movement is postcyclical (the 'Preposition Orphan Argument'):

(98) In English, a preposition may generally either be pied-piped or stranded:
(99)a To whom were you speaking
    b Who were you speaking to
(100) The same is true for long distance movement:
(101)a Who did you think Bill wanted Mary to talk to
    b To whom did you think Bill wanted Mary to talk

(102) "... the assumption of cyclical nature for WH Q MOVEMENT would mean that the trip
    to sentence initial position would have to be accompanied in several jumps, the wh-NP
    moving each time to the front of the next highest sentence. Under this assumption,
    however, there is no way to explain why the preposition cannot be left behind at any of
    these positions."

p.455

(103)a *Who did you think Bill wanted Mary to talk
    b *Who did you think to Bill wanted Mary to talk
    c *Who did to you think Bill wanted Mary to talk

(104) "But these facts follow automatically from stating the rule as a movement of the
    wh-NP with optional accompaniment of the preposition, if the movement is carried out in a
    single swoop. But this can only be done if the rule is noncyclical."

p.455

<Very interesting argument, but it seems to confuse two related but distinct notions - cyclic rules
and successive cyclic rules. At any rate, see Chomsky (1973) for a response to this argument.>

Postal also offers a direct argument that pronominalization is not cyclic:

(105) ![Diagram of sentence structure]
(106) Suppose pronominalization were cyclic. On the S₂ cycle, only forward pronominalization will be possible, and it will be obligatory. Thus, there will be no way to derive
(107) Which of the men who visited Betty do you think she hated

Thus, pronominalization is postcyclical. And since EQUI depends on pronominalization, it too is postcyclical. But Postal also reports an argument, attributed to George Lakoff, that EQUI is cyclic:
(108) "... clearly cyclical rules like RAISING and PASSIVE distort phrase structures in such a way that the defining configurations for the correct application of EQUI will not be met after these cyclical rules have applied. In short, these rules move the controller NP in such a way that it no longer stands in a generally specifiable relation to the NP whose deletion it determines." pp.485-486

(109) Harry wants to be seen by Lucille trying to kiss Betty
(110) [ S₄ Harry, want [ S₃ Lucille see [ S₂ Harry, try [ S₁ Harry, kiss Betty ]]] ]
    a   b   c

(111) "Here the c occurrence of Harry, must be deleted under EQUI by identity to the b occurrence. Yet this latter will undergo RAISING and PASSIVE on the S₃ cycle. After this, the b occurrence is no longer in a position to determine the deletion of the c occurrence. This naturally leads to the suggestion that EQUI apply in this case on the S₂ cycle, before the b occurrence of Harry, is raised and passivized on the S₃ cycle. Since, moreover, EQUI must apply again, deleting the b occurrence in terms of the a occurrence, which can only happen after the b occurrence has become a derived subject, the argument for cyclical application of EQUI becomes apparently overwhelming." p.486

Resolution of the apparent paradox:
Lakoff's argument doesn't show that "the deletion must be carried out cyclically but rather only that those NP which are ultimately to be deleted must be marked for this fact cyclically. That is, suppose in [(109)] on the S₂ cycle the c occurrence of Harry, is marked with some feature, let us call it [+Doom], a feature assigned by a rule to a particular NP, NPₐ, just in case:
[(112)]a NPₐ is the subject NP of a complement sentence Sₐ;
    b there is a coreferent of NPₐ in the immediately higher sentence Sₐ₊₁." p.486

(113) DOOM MARKING (cyclical)
WH Q MOVEMENT, WH REL MOVEMENT (last- or postcyclical)
PRONOMINALIZATION  (last- or postcyclical)
DOOM ERASURE
Interpretive (i.e., non-transformational) theories of pronouns, reflexives, and control

(114) Jackendoff (1972), further developing ideas of Jackendoff (1969) and Dougherty (1969), explores "the alternative theory that pronouns and reflexives are present in deep structure and that their antecedents are determined in the semantic component.

In this approach, which I will call the interpretive theory, noun phrases are unmarked for coreference relations in deep structure. Rules of semantic interpretation establish relations between pairs of noun phrases, marking them coreferential or noncoreferential with each other."  

p.108

(115) "Instead of being produced by transformations, pronouns and reflexives will be generated by the base component as lexical items, marked with the feature [+pro], but like other noun phrases, unmarked for reference. Reflexives, in addition, will be marked with the feature [+refl]."  

p.108

Motivation for an interpretive approach:

(116) "If a transformation produces pronouns, it must be able to make use of coreference relations. However, transformations generally cannot mention coreference relations: there is no rule, for example, that preposes a noun phrase if it is coreferential with some other noun phrase. Thus in stating pronominalization and reflexivization transformations that refer to intended coreference, we are implicitly granting transformations power which they do not in general possess. As part of the consistent effort to reduce the power of transformations, we will construct a theory of grammar in which no transformation can use coreference as a criterion of application."  

pp.108-109

(117) Possible response to this argument: As in Chomsky (1965), factor out of any particular transformations a general condition on 'recoverability of deletion'. As Chomsky notes, "...this identity condition need never be stated in the grammar, since it is a general condition on the functioning of grammars."  

p.225

(118) "A pronominalization transformation changes a fully specified noun phrase into a pronoun. This is the kind of drastic change in the form of lexical material we would like to eliminate from transformations under the constraints of the Extended Lexical Hypothesis ..."  

p.109

(119) "Interpretive rules that mark coreference can as easily mark a pair of noun phrases noncoreferential as coreferential ..." [while a transformational approach provides no obvious way to do this]  

p.109

<Much of modern binding theory assumes just such a parallelism between coreference and noncoreference specification.>

Another claimed advantage centers around the 'Bach-Peters Paradox' of Bach (1970), whereby in
a transformational account an infinite deep structure is apparently needed for sentences like (120).

(120) The man who deserves it will get the prize he wants

(121) "If the underlying structure of pronouns is a fully specified NP identical with its coreferent, both it and he in [(120)] must have infinite deep structures:

(4.2) The man [who deserves the prize [which the man [who ... ] wants ]] will get the prize [which the man [who deserves the prize [which ... ] wants]]" p.110

(122) "If the reference of pronouns is determined by a rule of semantic interpretation, the deep structure of [(120)] contains the pronouns themselves, so there is no recursion. Furthermore, in the process of semantic interpretation, a pronoun need not be replaced with a duplicate of the noun phrase with which it is coreferential (which would again bring up the problem of recursion), but rather it may just be marked coreferential with another noun phrase." p.110

Jackendoff's final argument is based on 'anaphoric epithets' (which J. calls 'pronominal epithets'):

(123)a I wanted Charlie to help me, but the bastard wouldn't do it
b Irving was besieged by a horde of bills and the poor guy couldn't pay them

(124) "There are many noun phrases such as the bum, the bastard, and the poor guy that can be used coreferentially with another noun phrase if they are reduced in stress. These 'pronominal epithets' can occur in some subset of the environments in which pronominalization is possible, and they function semantically more or less as specialized pronouns. We would obviously miss a generalization if we did not handle them by a rule of the same kind as pronominalization, hopefully a rule that could collapse with pronominalization." pp.110-111

(125) "In a transformational framework, however, the generalization cannot be captured. The pronominalization transformation changes NPs into pronouns. In a consistent treatment, in certain contexts an NP could be turned into a pronominal epithet instead. But then which pronominal epithet should the NP be changed into? The meaning is obviously changed if we substitute an epithet for a pronoun or one epithet for another." p.111

(126) "In an interpretive framework, we can mark epithets as special lexical items which may function as pronouns in certain contexts of the pronominalization rule, adding their lexical meaning to the intended attributes of the person they refer to. Thus no change need be made in the nature of the interpretive theory in order to include these cases."

<An important question: Is it necessary to treat anaphoric epithets as pronouns to capture their interpretive properties? We will see that Jackendoff's overall theory requires this, but for reasons that will be questioned later.>

-20-
Jackendoff’s theory

Three core properties of the theory:

(127) "First, coreference is an exclusively semantic property that cannot be referred to by transformations."

(128) "Second, coreference is an aspect of semantic interpretation that has nothing to do with the functional structure of the sentence."

(129) "Third, coreference is formalized in the present approach as a binary relation holding between two NPs (or their semantic readings). Three or more NPs can be understood as mutually coreferential only if they have been marked pairwise coreferential."

The technical guts of the theory:

(130) "... we will express coreference relations explicitly in a table of coreference. Each entry in the table will consist of a pair of noun phrases and one of the relations coreferential or noncoreferential. In a complete semantic interpretation, the table will contain an entry for each pair of noun phrases in the sentence. The table will be built up one entry at a time by the application of semantic rules of coreference."

The completed table is subject to well-formedness conditions, including:

(131) Consistency Condition

If the table of coreference marks two NPs coreferential, those NPs must in fact be able to describe the same individual.

(132) John washed himself
(133a) John washed him
   b John washed John
   c John washed Bill

Reflexives

(134) Reflexivization, first approximation (abstracting away from environment statement)

\( \alpha \) is a variable to be replaced by + or -, but both occurrences of \( \alpha \) must be replaced with the same sign on any particular application of the rule.

Enter in the table:

\[ \text{NP}^1 \alpha \text{ coref } \left[ \begin{array}{c} \text{NP}^2 \\ \alpha \text{ reflexive} \end{array} \right] \text{ in the environment ...} \]

OBLIGATORY

"[(134)] says that in the proper contexts for reflexivization, NP\(^2\) is coreferential with NP\(^1\) if and only if it is reflexive."
Table entries for (132)-(133):

(135)  \textit{John} coref \textit{himself}
(136)a. \textit{John} -coref \textit{him}
    b. \textit{John} -coref \textit{John}
    c. \textit{John} -coref \textit{Bill}

(137)  Bill told John about himself
(138)  Convention on the application of (134):
       "... if two possible environments for interpretation of a reflexive crop up at once, either
       reading is possible."  

(139)  *The boy shot herself
(140)  \textit{the boy} coref \textit{herself}

(141)  This "can be rejected by the Consistency Condition [(131)]. \textit{The boy} describes a male
       individual, \textit{herself} a female. Obviously, then, they cannot be used to describe the same
       individual. Yet the table of coreference requires that they do. The conclusion must be that
       the sentence is deviant."  

(142)  *Himself was sick
(143)  (Requirement that reflexives have antecedents)
       For every reflexive $R$ in a sentence, there must exist an entry in the table of coreference
       of the form $X$ coref $R$, where $X$ is some other NP in the sentence.

(144)  *Himself shot himself
(145)  \textit{himself} coref \textit{himself}

(146)  "Though both NPs appear in the table, only one appears on the right-hand side of an
       entry, as required by the condition. The covert assumption is that there is a formal
       distinction between the left-hand side of the table, containing antecedents (NP$^1$ in the
       reflexive rule) and the right-hand side, containing corresponding anaphoric expressions
       (NP$^2$ in the rule)."

(147)  "Condition [(143)] differs from the Consistency Condition in that it appears to be a
       purely formal requirement on the table. It is not connected with conceptualization of the
       world since it deals only with the occurrence of the feature \textit{refl} in the table."
Pronouns

(148) John looked at him noncoreferential
(149) John said that he was sick ambiguous
(150) John said that John was sick noncoreferential
(151) John said that Bill was sick noncoreferential

(152) "Pronouns are at most optionally coreferential with another NP. Any two nonpronominial noun phrases in the same sentence, morphologically identical or not, are always noncoreferential." p.116

<This assumption about the facts is in large part responsible for Jackendoff's claim that anaphoric epithets are a kind of pronoun. However the assumption is not obviously correct, as seen in examples like
(153) John's students admire John
More on this later.>

(154) Pronominalization rule, first approximation

Enter in the table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NP¹</th>
<th>coref</th>
<th>[NP²] + pro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

in the environment ...

OPTIONAL

Crucially, in addition to this coreference rule, we need a noncoreference rule:

(155) Noncoreferentiality rule

If for any NP¹ and NP² in a sentence, there is no entry in the table NP¹ ±coref NP², enter in the table NP¹ -coref NP².

OBLIGATORY

(156) "This rule says that any noun phrases that have not yet been related by a rule of coreference are noncoreferential. The application of [(155)] ensures that every pair of NPs appears in the table." p.116

How the rules interact to give the right result for (148):

(157) "In [(148)], reflexivization obligatorily applies, entering John -coref him in the table. If pronominalization were then to apply, it would enter John coref him in the table. But then the reading of the sentence would be anomalous, since the table would assert that John and him both do and do not refer to the same individual. The Consistency Condition rejects this interpretation." p.116
Analysis of (149) ("John said that he was sick")

(158) "In [(149)], reflexivization does not apply <Of course, this depends on the environment of the rule.>, but pronominalization may apply, entering John coref him in the table. If pronominalization does not apply, the table is empty when the noncoreferentiality rule is applicable, so the rule enters John -coref him in the table, producing the other possible reading of the sentence." p.116

Analysis of (150) ("John said that John was sick") and (151) ("John said that Bill was sick"):

(159) "In [(150)] and [(151)], only the noncoreferentiality rule is applicable, so the two NPs are marked distinct." p.116

(160) John said that Bill had shot him

(161) Reflexivization enters Bill -coref him in the table.

(162) Pronominalization applies between John and him.

(163) Noncoreferentiality rule applies between John and Bill.

(164) Bill -coref him
      John coref him
      John -coref Bill

Or, if we choose not to apply pronominalization at all, noncoreferentiality applies between John and him yielding:

(165) Bill -coref him
      John -coref him
      John -coref Bill

(166) "... it should be noticed that no ordering has been established between reflexivization and pronominalization... The non-coreferentiality rule must, however, follow both of these rules." p.117

Environment for Pronominalization

The transformational predecessors of Jackendoff's interpretive rules were essentially correct about the structural environments of the rules (and, in fact, the ordering of the rules vis à vis movement transformations). So the interpretive rules could be ordered just where the transformations had been, and the environment of the transformations is replicated. As for ordering, Jackendoff ultimately concludes (for theory internal reasons (pp.129-131)) that Pronominalization is cyclic, following all transformations on each cycle <a very important foreshadowing of Multiple Spell Out>, and that the Noncoreferentiality rule is last cyclic, following all transformations on the final cycle of the derivation.
Pronominalization rule

Enter in the table:

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{NP}^1 \text{ coref} & \text{NP}^2 & + \text{ pro} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

unless \text{NP}^2 \text{ both precedes and commands } \text{NP}^1

OPTIONAL

(168)
a Jake left town after he robbed the bank
b *He left town after Jake robbed the bank
c After Jake robbed the bank, he left town
d After he robbed the bank, Jake left town

(169) "With the antecedent to the left ('forward pronominalization'), pronominalization is generally possible. With the antecedent to the right ('backward pronominalization'), the pronoun must not command the antecedent."

(170) The fact that Mary realized John was sick bothered him

(171)

(172) The fact that he realized John was sick bothered him
According to Jackendoff, (173) is surprising, since, when he and him are coreferential, forward pronominalization (between John and him) is evidently bad. Here is his account:

(174) Pronominalization can apply between he and him and also between John and him.
(175) Pronominalization cannot apply between he and John, since he precedes and commands John.
(176) Thus, the noncoreferentiality rule will apply to he and John.

(177) he coref him  
      John coref him  
      he -coref John

(178) "... this table is inconsistent: it asserts that him is the same individual as two distinct individuals. Therefore the reading must be rejected.
(179) This leaves open only the possibility of marking him coreferential with one or the other of the other two NPs, letting the noncoreferentiality rule to [sic] mark it noncoreferential from the other."  

The last cyclic nature of the noncoreferentiality rule (155):

(180) Who that Mary knew do you think she visited
(181) [s1 you think [s2 she visited who [s3 that Mary knew ]]]
(182) “In [(181)], the environment for pronominalization does not appear on the S^2 cycle. However, after fronting on the S^1 cycle to form (180), the pronoun and NP can be marked coreferential.
(183) If [the noncoreferentiality rule (155)] were in the cycle ... it would apply obligatorily on the S^2 cycle of [(181)], to mark she and Mary distinct, since that pair is not yet entered in the table of coreference... But if we make the noncoreferentiality rule last-cyclic, pronominalization will have a second chance to apply to she and Mary, on the S^1 cycle, giving the correct reading.
Only if pronominalization does not apply at any point in the derivation... do we want the conditions for the noncoreferentiality rule to be met.”

Environment for Reflexivization

Jackendoff’s statement incorporates a version of the clause-mate and command requirements. Note that Jackendoff, following Chomsky (1970), takes S and NP to be the cyclic nodes.

Reflexivization

\[
\text{NP}_1 \alpha \text{ coref} \left[ \begin{array}{c}
\alpha \text{ reflexive} \\
\text{NP}_2
\end{array} \right]
\]

if each of the following conditions holds:

(a) \(\text{NP}_2\) has not yet appeared on the right-hand (i.e., anaphoric expression) side of the table;
(b) \(\text{NP}_2\) is immediately dominated (except for a possible preposition [sic]) by VP or N’;
(c) \(\text{NP}_1\) is in the main clause of the present cycle;
(d) \(\text{NP}_2\) does not both precede and command \(\text{NP}_1\).

*John thinks that himself is sick [Out by (b), plus noncoref. rule. Condition (b) is necessary since J. has given up the simplex sentence condition.]

*a The book which I gave John impressed himself
b *I gave a book about John to himself [These are out by (c) plus noncoref. rule.]

Thematic Hierarchy Condition

1. Agent
2. Location, Source, Goal
3. Theme

A reflexive may not be higher on the Thematic Hierarchy than its antecedent

*John was shaved by himself

John is Theme and himself is Agent, so THC is violated.

*Himself was shaved by John

THC is satisfied but the example “violates the structural condition on reflexivization, so it is much more crashingly ungrammatical.”

John was touching the bookcase

John is ambiguous between Agent and Theme. The bookcase is Location (or possibly Goal).
(193) John was touching himself

*John is only Agent. p.149

(194) *John was being touched by himself

Satisfies THC on reflexivization, but violates another THC: In passives, the by-phrase must be higher on the hierarchy than the derived subject.

(195) Bill strikes Harry as pompous

*Bill is Theme and *Harry is Goal.

(196) *I strike myself as pompous

Out by THC.

(197) Bill regards Harry as pompous

*Bill is Goal and *Harry is Theme.

(198) *I regard myself as pompous

(199) *John appears to himself to have hit Bill

J. wants this to violate THC, even though John is an Agent and himself a Goal.

(200) “It is reasonable that a raised NP such as the derived subject of seem [or appear] has no thematic relation at all with respect to its new clause, since thematic relations are related to deep structure grammatical relations ... Then, to prevent [(199)], we need only assume that lack of thematic relation counts as the lowest position on the Thematic Hierarchy.” p.154

(201) John and Bill like each other

(202) *John and Bill thought that Mary liked each other

(203) Each other is a reflexive pronoun p.170

(204) John and Bill told me stories about themselves/each other

(205) *John and Bill told me Mary’s stories about themselves/each other

(206) *John and Bill strike each other as pompous

Control

(207)a Bill hoped to be able to leave soon

b Bill hoped for Sam to be able to leave soon

c Bill hoped for Bill to be able to leave soon

d Bill hoped for him to be able to leave soon
(208) “We observe that only when the complement subject is absent on the surface is it interpreted as coreferential with the subject of the main clause... The rule apparently looks rather like reflexivization.”

(209) The complement subject “cannot be any normal pronoun or NP, as we can see from [(207)a-d]. One solution might involve a special pro-NP (call it DEL) which has no phonological interpretation and serves the sole semantic function of acting as a coreferential subject complement [sic].”

(210) Complement Subject Rule, first approximation

Enter in the table:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{NP}^1 \alpha \text{coref NP}^2 \text{ if } \text{NP}^2 \text{ is the subject of a for-to or poss-ing complement, NP}^1 \text{ is in the main clause of the present cycle, and NP}^2 \text{ is alpha equal to DEL.}
\end{array}
\]

OBLIGATORY

(211) Additional well-formedness condition: Reject any reading with an uninterpreted DEL.

(212) Bill hoped [for DEL to be able to leave soon]

Cycle 1: nothing happens
Cycle 2: (210) enters Bill coref DEL in the table

(213) For all of (207)b-d, NP$^2 \neq$ DEL.

Problem with (210): “it requires a special pro-NP which is required nowhere else in the grammar ...”

Alternative (attributed by J. to Chomsky):

(214) “Suppose that the phrase structure rules and lexical insertion are optional, so that potential deep structures can be generated containing nonterminal nodes ... symbolized by \( \Delta \) ... these structures would be semantically ill-formed, since no semantic information would be available for empty nodes... <a precursor of Full Interpretation?>

(215) Suppose that some rules of semantic interpretation give readings to empty nodes ... under certain conditions. Then the semantic blocking of an empty node can be prevented, just in case it is interpreted by one of these rules.”

Jackendoff’s treatment of the famous example of Ross (1967b), where forward pronominalization seems to be blocked:

(216) Realizing that John was sick bothered him  <Ross’s actual ex. is “Realizing that Oscar was unpopular didn't disturb him”.

-29-
(217) 

(218) -S^3 cycle: nothing  
-S^2 cycle: pronominalization can’t apply between Δ and John, so they are eventually marked distinct by the noncoreferentiality rule (on the final cycle)  
-S^1 cycle: complement subject rule applies marking Δ coreferential with him  
(219) If pronominalization also applies between John and him, a paradoxical reading results:  
John coref him 
him coref Δ  
Δ -coref John  
(220) The only possibility, then, is not to apply pronominalization between John and him.  

Wasow (1972) - a (mostly) interpretive theory  
For reflexives, Wasow adopts the transformational approach of Helke (1971):  
(221) "... reflexives consist of a head noun self with a possessive pronominal determiner. The necessary agreement between this determiner and some other NP in the same clause is accounted for by a transformation which inserts pronominal copies of the NP's into empty determiner nodes."  
(222) "The constraint that reflexives and their antecedents be in the same simplex sentence ... is accounted for by Chomsky's insertion prohibition (Chomsky (1965, p.146 <(28) above>)" p.17  

All the rest of Wasow's theory is interpretive. In particular  
(223) "... there is no transformation of Pronominalization which replaces an NP by a definite pronoun when the NP meets certain conditions of identity with another NP." p.21
Wasow's initial statement of the conditions on definite NP anaphora:

(224) Given an NP and a definite pronoun in the same sentence, the NP may serve as the antecedent for the pronoun unless
(a) the pronoun and the NP disagree in gender, person, and number;
(b) the pronoun is to the left of the NP and the pronoun is not more deeply embedded than the NP

(225) "...the best criterion for deciding the theoretical status of [(224)] is whether it obeys the various constraints which have been proposed for the different categories of rules. Judging by this criterion, anaphora rules seem to belong to none of the usual categories, for they obey none of the constraints on syntactic and semantic rules proposed in Ross (1967a) and [Chomsky (1973)]." pp.79-80

(226) "This conclusion is supported by the fact that anaphoric relations may hold between elements of different sentences. In this respect anaphora differs from all other syntactic and semantic phenomena [sic] which have been studied by generative grammarians... One rather attractive suggestion that has been made with respect to the theoretical status of anaphora rules is that they are not rules of any particular grammar, but part of linguistic theory... Although little work has been done on anaphora in languages other than English, the fact that no grammar book of any language ever includes instructions for associating pronouns and antecedents suggests that people learning foreign languages do not have much trouble with this aspect, which in turn suggests that the rule involved may be universal. (This was pointed out by Witten (1970))." p.80

**Strong Crossover**

(227)a Who said Mary kissed him
b *Who did he say Mary kissed

(228)a The man who said Mary kissed him was lying
b *The man who he said Mary kissed was lying

We can't handle this by ordering the pronominal anaphora rule (224) before WH-movement, because of:

(229)a *He finally married one of the girls Bill had been dating
b Which of the girls Bill had been dating did he finally marry p.138

Wasow's solution (with the core idea -trace theory - attributed to Peter Culicover, and also to the 1971 manuscript version of Chomsky (1973)):

(230) "WH-fronting could be formulated so that a phonetically null copy of the WH-word is left behind in its pre-fronting position. By the arguments of Chapter 1 §3.3, this copy would necessarily be anaphorically related to the WH-word. Hence, if the WH-word itself enters into an anaphoric relation with a pronoun, then by the Transitivity Condition (Chapter 1, §§3.2.1. & 3.2.2), the copy and the pronoun must enter into an anaphoric relation. If this relation is blocked, then the sentence is deviant. It therefore follows that WH-words' behavior with respect to anaphora should be just what it would be if they were in their pre-fronting positions." p.139
Transitivity condition

(231) If A, B, and C are three elements in a sentence such that an anaphoric relation holds between A and B and an anaphoric relation holds between B and C, then the sentence is marked ungrammatical unless an anaphoric relation holds between A and C.

(232)a  He said [Mary kissed someone]
        b  Who did he say [Mary kissed Δ]

(233) "Now, if who and he in [(232)b] are to be allowed to enter into an anaphoric relation, the Transitivity Condition requires that Δ and he also be anaphorically related. Consequently, the resultant sentence will be ungrammatical for the same reason that [(232)a] is."  p.139

Wasow acknowledges a potential problem, then proposes a solution that will seem familiar:

(234) "... if, as the previous chapter suggested, empty nodes are to be treated by the anaphora rules just like pro-forms, then there is no reason why he may not serve as the antecedent for Δ, in which case the relevant anaphoric relations would always be possible ... So some means must be found to keep he from serving as the antecedent of Δ.

This can be accomplished formally simply by marking the traces left behind by WH-fronting with some feature (e.g., [-pro]) which distinguishes them from pronouns."  pp.139-140

"Conditions on Transformations" Chomsky (1973)

In this work, Chomsky developed a set of conditions on movement, and used them, directly or indirectly, to handle restrictions (of the clause-mate sort) on anaphoric processes.

(235)  The dog is believed [ __ to be hungry]
(236)  *The dog is believed [ __ is hungry]

(237) Tensed Sentence Condition (1st version)

No rule can involve X, Y in the structure

...X...[α...Y...]

where α is a tensed sentence

Reciprocals were treated with an each-movement transformation, a partial retreat from the 'interpretive' account of Jackendoff:

(238)a  The candidates each hated the other(s)
        b  The candidates each expected [the other(s) to win]
        c  The candidates each expected [that the other(s) would win]
(239)a  The candidates hated each other
        b  The candidates expected [each other to win]
        c  *The candidates expected [that each other would win]
Passive (i.e., NP preposing) and each-movement obey (237).

"...one rule that obviously does not satisfy the condition is Coreference Assignment..." as in (242).

John said that he would leave

<Much more on this shortly>

The candidates expected [__ to defeat each other]

*The men expected [the soldier to shoot each other]

Specified Subject Condition (1st version)

No rule can involve X, Y in the structure

...X...[__Z...-WYV...]

where Z is the specified subject of WYV in α

'Specified subject': "a subject NP that contains either lexical items or a pronoun that is not anaphoric"

In (244), the soldier is Z, blocking each-movement from the candidates (X) to the other(s) (Y).

The men saw [NP pictures of each other]

*The men saw [NP John's pictures of each other]

NP counts as a relevant α (as already hinted by Jackendoff).

*I saw me

*I saw us

c *We saw me

d He saw him

e The soldiers shot the officers (among them)

RI: "a rule of interpretation applying to the structure NP-V-NP (among others) [that]

seeks to interpret the two NPs as nonintersecting in reference, and where this is impossible... it assigns 'strangeness'."

<Chomsky correctly relates this to Postal's TIC mentioned above. Chomsky, though, calls Postal's condition the "Unlike Person Constraint", a name that Postal never used as far as I can tell.>

We expect [them to visit me]

*We expect [me to visit them]

c We believe [I may still win]

In (252)a, c, RI is blocked by SSC and TSC, respectively.
(254) No rule can involve X, Y in the structure
...X...[Z...-WYV...]
where (a) Z is the specified subject of WYV
or (b) Y is in COMP and X is not in COMP
or (c) Y is not in COMP and X is a tensed S

(255) "...under the analysis proposed here there is no necessity for a rule raising the subject of
an embedded sentence to the object position of the matrix sentence..."
<Only a finite clause, not just any clause, blocks RI, passive, and each-movement.>

(256)a *We persuaded Bill [PRO to kill each other]
b  We promised Bill [PRO to kill each other]

(257)a  I (we) persuaded Bill [PRO to kill us]
b *I (we) promised Bill [PRO to kill us]
Sometimes a null subject does count as a Z, blocking relations between X and Y.

(258) Z is a specified subject with respect to X if it is not 'controlled' by (a category containing) X. (If Z is lexically specified, it is not controlled at all. PRO is controlled in the standard sense. Trace is controlled by its antecedent.)

(259)a *They appealed to John [PRO to like each other]
b  They appeared to John [t to like each other]  <t is trace, used by Chomsky for the first time here.>

(260)a  We appealed to John [PRO to like us]
b *We appeared to John [t to like us]
Given the generality of (254) (No rule can ...) the question arises of how long distance movement is ever possible.

(261)a  Who do you believe [John to have seen t]
b  Who do you believe [t saw Mary]
Wh-Movement is argued here for the first time to be 'successive cyclic', involving movement into the most local clause initial position ('COMP'), then from there into the next higher COMP, and so on up the phrase structure tree. In addition, S', and not S, is taken to be the relevant sentential domain. In both (261)a and b, then, the initial movement is into the lower COMP. This correctly renders SSC ineffectual for (261)a. The first movement is entirely inside α. For the second movement, from the lower to the higher COMP, movement is from a position outside the domain of the lower subject to a position that is still inside the only potential higher α.

Example (261)b raises more difficult problems. The initial movement, that into the lower COMP, is once again in accord with the conditions. The movement into the matrix COMP would seem to be in violation of TSC, however. The complement S', being tensed, is a relevant α. Chomsky winds up simply stipulating that Wh-Movement from COMP (and to another COMP)
is exempt from the TSC: (254)b,c.

Thus, when Y is in COMP, TSC is void. Note that this exemption is not available for (248)b, since there is no intermediate COMP for Y, NP differing from S’ in that regard. The necessity of including the complication in (254) suggests that (254) is irrelevant to Wh-Movement entirely. Freidin and Lasnik (1981) argue at some length that this is, in fact, the case <more on this below>. This would leave (248)b unexplained, but, as Chomsky observes, entirely apart from the SSC, definiteness (or perhaps specificity) is relevant to Wh extraction:

(262) *Who did you see [the pictures of t]

Interestingly, one of the prior and subsequent major cases of anaphora, reflexivization, is almost entirely ignored. The only mentions (pp. 241 and 251) are the hint that the copying approach of Helke (1971) "...fits very well into the present framework."

Lasnik (1976)

(263)a Oscar finally realized that he is unpopular  
b *Oscar finally realized that Oscar is unpopular  
c *He finally realized that Oscar is unpopular  
d He finally realized that Mary is unpopular

(264) An obligatory pronominalization transformation can rule out (263)b, but says nothing about (263)c, given that He is perfectly capable of referring to Oscar even when no pronominalization T is relevant, as in (263)d.

New empirical claim: In situations where backwards pronominalization is possible, so is forwards pronominalization, and further pronominalization need not obtain at all:

(265) That Oscar/he is unpopular was finally realized by Oscar

(266) Noncoreference rule - 1st approximation:  
If NP₁ precedes and commands NP₂, and NP₂ is not a pronoun, then NP₁ and NP₂ are noncoreferential.  
[A commands B if the minimal S node dominating A also dominates B.]  
 p.6

<Notice that the indices in the noncoreference rule are not 'referential indices'. Rather, they are just for ease of exposition. (266), like Chomsky's RI (251), makes no use of referential indices, in strong contrast to some of Chomsky's later (and earlier) theories.>

<See also Culicover (1976) for a coreference restriction based on precedence and Klima's 'in construction with'.>

(267) Compare 'RI' of Chomsky (1973), which, "applying to the structure NP-V-NP (among others) seeks to interpret the two NPs as nonintersecting in reference..."
Recall the Jackendoff (1972) theory of anaphora:
- Optionally label NP¹ and NP² [+Pro] +coref unless NP² both precedes and commands
  NP¹.
- Obligatory label any two NPs -coref if they have not been labelled +coref.

The coreference rule in (268) is evidently superfluous for cases where it is empirically
correct. Further, it incorrectly bans coreference between any two NPs if neither is a
pronoun.

After I hit John, the sissy screamed

*John realizes that the sissy is going to lose
b *He realizes that the sissy is going to lose
c *The sissy realizes that the sissy is going to lose

Anaphoric epithets behave like names rather than like pronouns.

"Split antecedence"

After John talked to Mary, they left the room

The problem of 'split antecedents' disappears (at least for referential pronouns): they is
free to refer to any plurality at all, as long as (266) is satisfied.

Still problematic though are split antecedent examples with quantificational antecedents, as in

Every violinist told some pianist that they should play a duet.

Transitivity effects

*The woman he loved told him that John was a jerk

(266) subsumes the effects (for NPs) of Jackendoff's (1972) Transitivity Condition, adopted by Wasow (1972) in the following form: If A, B, and C are three elements in a sentence such that an anaphoric relation holds between A and B and an anaphoric relation holds between B and C, then the sentence is marked ungrammatical unless an anaphoric relation holds between A and C.

Command → kommand

His/John's mother loves John

*He/John loves John's mother
Noncoreference rule - 2nd approximation:
If NP_1 precedes and kommands NP_2, and NP_2 is not a pronoun, then NP_1 and NP_2 are noncoreferential. [A kommands B if the minimal cyclic node dominating A also dominates B.]

Inclusion effects

(281) They assume that Bob will talk to Tom
(282) Their parents told Mary to play with Susan

Noncoreference rule - Final: If NP_1 precedes and kommands NP_2, and NP_2 is not a pronoun, then NP_1 and NP_2 are disjoint in reference. p.16

Pronouns as bound variables

(284) Everyone believes that he is unattractive
(285) *Everyone's mother believes that he is unattractive
(286) Everyone sat down after he walked in
(287) *After he walked in, everyone sat down

(288) A pronoun can function as a variable bound by a quantifier only if the quantifier both precedes and kommands the pronoun. p.18

(289) Who thinks he can solve the problem
(290) *Who does he think can solve the problem
(291) The scope of a Wh operator is assigned cyclically. Thus, he cannot be in the scope of Who in (290).
(292) Harry believes he is intelligent, and Bill does too [Sloppy OK]
(293) Harry's mother believes he is intelligent, and Bill's mother does too [Sloppy *]
(294) Deletion under sloppy identity is only possible when the antecedent of the deleted pronoun both precedes and kommands the pronoun. p.20
(295) 'Sloppy' identity is really full identity. The deleted VP contains a bound variable, as does the antecedent VP.

"Conditions on Rules of Grammar" (1976)

In Chomsky (1976), we find one rather significant departure from Chomsky (1973), namely, the conjecture that TSC and SSC are solely constraints on anaphoric relations of a particular type, rather than (also) on the operation of transformations. Reciprocals are now treated in terms of a reciprocal rule which 'assigns an appropriate sense to sentences of the form NP . . . each other',
as suggested in Jackendoff (1972) and developed in Fiengo and Lasnik (1973). Further, it is proposed that the relation between an NP that has undergone NP Movement and the position from which it moved is one of bound anaphora, as proposed by Fiengo (1974). As such, it would naturally fall under the same conditions as reciprocal interpretation. Chomsky thus tentatively concludes that "we can regard SSC, in such cases, as a condition on surface structures applying quite generally to anaphora (hence to the NP-trace relation), rather than a condition on transformations".

(296)a  The men like each other  
b  *The men want [John to like each other]
(297) Reciprocal interpretation assigns an appropriate sense to sentences of the form NP...each other (and is constrained by the conditions).

(298)a  The men like them  
b  The men want [John to like them]
(299) Disjoint reference (DR) assigns disjoint reference to a pair (NP, pronoun) (and is constrained by the conditions).

(300)a  John seems [t to like Bill]  
b  *John seems [Bill to like t]
(301) "...the relation between NP and the trace that it controls [is] a special case of bound anaphora..." That relation is constrained by the conditions. The conditions thus are conditions on surface structure applying to anaphora. (I have illustrated SSC. TSC is the same.)

For examples like (302)-(303), Chomsky continued to assume the (1973) definition of 'specified subject'. In retrospect, it is clear that such a complication was unnecessary. Rather, instead of the transparent subjects not counting as Z, they would count as X. That is, the PRO or trace could be the relevant antecedent.

(302)a  *They appealed to John [PRO to like each other]  
b  They appeared to John [t to like each other]
(303)a  We appealed to John [PRO to like us]  
b  *We appeared to John [t to like us]
(304) The rules of anaphora relate surface structures (enriched to include traces) to LF. Perhaps more generally, surface structure determines LF.

(305) John thought that Bill liked him
(306) (305) is not a problem as it does not involve a rule of sentence grammar at all.
The problem, of course, is "He thought that Bill liked John", which crucially does involve a rule of sentence grammar, as evidenced immediately below.

Who said Mary kissed him
b Who said he kissed Mary
c Who did he say Mary kissed (Wasow's 'Strong Crossover')

John said Mary kissed him
b John said he kissed Mary
c He said Mary kissed John

for which person x, he said Mary kissed x

Taking a variable to function as a name, (308)c then reduces to (309)c. But then we clearly are dealing with a rule of sentence grammar - the one barring anaphoric connection here. And this rule does not obey the conditions.

Reinhart (1976)  c-command

"The restrictions on anaphora must ... specify the structural conditions under which two given NP's cannot have an anaphoric relation (or corefer). The relation of precede-and-command ... has been supposed to capture these conditions. I will argue, however, ... that this relation plays no role in determining anaphora options and has, probably, no other linguistic relevance."  

"My concern in the discussion to follow is, primarily, to define the structural relations which restrict anaphora options. However, a proper specification of these structural relations has much broader consequences: I will argue that these relations define a more general notion of the syntactic domain of a given node and that anaphora rules are restricted to operate on two given NP's just in case one of these NP's is in the domain of the other."

"Lasnik's observation enables us to restate the problem of coreference restriction: the problem is not specifying the conditions under which a pronoun can precede its antecedent or under which an NP cannot be coreferential with a pronoun to its left (as all previous discussions assumed), rather, specifying the conditions under which coreference between two definite NP's is not free.

Stated in terms of syntactic domains, the resulting picture is that given two NP's, the crucial question is whether either of them is in the domain of the other. If this is not the case, there are no restrictions on the coreference options of these two NP's - they can be coreferential (or noncoreferential) regardless of whether they are pronouns or full NP's, and regardless of their linear order, in case only one of them is a pronoun. But, if one of the two NP's in question is in the domain of the other, the coreference restriction permits coreference only if this NP is a pronoun, and again, regardless of whether the other NP, which is the head of the domain, is a pronoun or not."

"... the terms antecedent and anaphor are superfluous, As we have seen, the problem is
not defining the structural relations between antecedents and anaphors, but rather defining the structural conditions which affect the coreference options of any two NP's."

pp.50-51, fn.8

A conceptual problem with traditional precede and command:

(317) "One of the problems with the syntactic domain defined in terms of precede-and-command ... is that it makes very little sense, since the domains produced are quite arbitrary. If the domain of a node A is everything to its right which is commanded by it, then given a sentence S, we can cut at any arbitrary node and consider it together with all the nodes to its right which are dominated by S as constituting a domain.

(318) Given a sentence like Ben introduced Max to Rosa in September, for instance, the domains picked out are, first, the domain of the subject (the whole sentence) and the domain of the verb (the VP, including the PPs). Since these domains are also constituents, their linguistic relevance is obvious. However, the same definition also yields the domains [Max / to Rosa in September], [to Rosa / in September], and [Rosa / in September]. In the same way, given a sentence like The cover of the book is lost, [the book / is lost] is one of the domains produced. If such arbitrary chunks of the tree constitute a syntactic domain, it is hard to see what content the notion of domain could have."

p.22

<Note that the last mentioned of the problems goes away once command is extended from S to all cyclic nodes. Note too that the remaining problems persist under current views of binary branching.>

Empirical problems (some of them due to Lakoff (1968)):

Unexpected coreference

(319)a Near him, Dan saw a snake.
   b In her bed, Zelda spent her sweetest hours.
   c For his wife, Ben would give his life.
   d How obnoxious to his friends Ben is.
   e Fond of his wife though Ben is, I like her even more.
   f(I predicted that Rosa would quit her job and) quit her job Rosa finally did.

Unexpected noncoreference

(320)a *Near Dan, he saw a snake.
   b *In Zelda's bed, she spent her sweetest hours.
   c *For Ben's wife, he would give his life.
   d *How obnoxious to Ben's friends he is.
   e *Fond of Ben's wife though he is, I like her even more.
   f *(I predicted that Rosa would quit her job and) quit Rosa's job she finally did.
In all of (319), the pronoun precedes and commands the name, yet coreference is still possible. (Note, though, that in (319)b,c,e kommand does not obtain.) And in all of (320), the pronoun follows the name, yet coreference is not possible.

Reinhart rejects a rule ordering account of these facts (what would be essentially a 'reconstruction' analysis) based in part on examples like these (repeated from above):

(321)

(a) Jake left town after he robbed the bank
   b *He left town after Jake robbed the bank
   c After Jake robbed the bank, he left town
   d After he robbed the bank, Jake left town

Assuming (b) to be basic, ordering the coreference condition before preposing would incorrectly rule out (c). Similarly for:

(322) Who that Mary knew do you think she visited

(323) All these kinds of cases "... suggest that there must be some structural properties of the surface structure of these sentences which determine their coreference options. These properties cannot be captured by the relation of precede-and-command ... " p.26

Precede and command replaced by c-command

(324) C-command (1st version) <The name attributed by Reinhart to Nick Clements>
   Node A c(onstituent)-commands node B if neither A nor B dominates the other and the first branching node which dominates A dominates B.

(325) "The linguistic need for a relation like [(324)] has been observed before for problems other than coreference: [(324)] is the converse of the relation in construction with which was suggested by Klima (1964) to account for the scope of negation.

(326) (In [(324)], node B is in construction with node A.)

(327) It is also very close to the relation superiority suggested by Chomsky (1973), the difference being that superiority is asymmetric - nodes A and B cannot be superior to each other. Thus, sister nodes are excluded from the superiority relation, while definition [(324)] includes sisters (i.e., nodes that c-command each other).

(328) The difference between the relations of command and of c-command is that while the first mentions cyclic nodes, the second does not - all branching nodes can be relevant to the determination of c-command relations." p.32
(329) \[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{cy}_1 \\
A \\
B \\
C \\
\hline
D \\
\text{cy}_2 \\
E \\
F
\end{array} \]

(330) "... node A both commands and c-commands all the other nodes in [(329)] - as is also true for node C - but node D, while commanding node C (since it is dominated by \text{cy}_1 which dominates C) does not c-command node C, since the first branching node dominating D, namely B, does not dominate C." p.32

(331) The domain of a node A consists of A together with all and only the nodes c-commanded by A. (OR: The domain of a node A is the subtree dominated by the first branching node which dominates A.)

(332) "What the definition in [(331)] does, basically, is to select the minimal constituent of a node (\(\alpha\)), namely all the nodes dominated by the node (\(\beta\)) immediately dominating this node (\(\alpha\))." p.34

(333) \[ S \\
PP \\
NP_1 \\
VP \\
P \\
(NP) \\
V \\
NP_2 \\
NP_3 \]

(334) \[ S \\
NP_1 \\
VP \\
PP \\
V \\
NP_2 P \\
(S) \\
(NP) \\
NP_3 \]

(335) "... in both trees NP_1 c-commands (and commands) NP_3, the only difference being that in [(333)] NP_3 precedes NP_1, while in [(334)] NP_3 follows NP_1. Therefore, by the c-command definition of domain, NP_3 is in the domain of NP_1 in both trees (in other words,
all the nodes in S are in the domain of the subject regardless of whether they precede or follow it). Hence, the coreference rule ... requires that in both trees, NP₃ must be a pronoun in order to be coreferential with NP₁. Applied to sentences with the structure of [(333)], this restriction blocks coreference in [(336)]

(336)a  *Near Dan, he saw a snake  \textit{<BUT cf.} Near Dan, I think he saw a snake>  
b  *Near Dan, Dan saw a snake

(337) "In a right-branching language it is often the case that the c-commanding node precedes the c-commanded node... This may account for how it has been possible for the precede-and-command rule to yield the right prediction in such an amazing number of cases and to nevertheless be the wrong rule. It may also help explain why the relation of precede is believed to play such a crucial role in the grammatical restrictions on coreference. Obviously, in an overwhelmingly large body of the language, forward pronominalization is the only grammatical option. Given the c-command relation, this fact is just an obvious result of application of the coreference rule to right-branching trees. This is not true for the relation \textit{command}, where all the nodes dominated by the same S equally command each other. A rule stated in terms of command must therefore introduce the relation precede into the rule of coreference."  

(338) "It is clear that the large correlation between the domains defined by precede-and-command and by c-command holds only for right-branching languages. The sharpest discrepancy between the domains picked up by the two definitions will show up in VOS languages (assuming that these languages have a VP). In such languages a preceding node would often be in the domain of a following node... the following examples from Malagasy (a VOS language with some evidence for a VP) suggest that this hypothesis should be considered. (The examples are from Ed Keenan; personal communication.)

(339)a  namono  azy ny anadahin-dRakoto  
hit / killed \textit{him} the sister-of-Rakoto  
Rakoto's sister killed him.  
b  *namono ny anadahin-dRakoto izy  
hit / killed the sister-of-Rakoto \textit{he}  
\textit{he} killed Rakoto's sister.

In [(339)a] the pronoun precedes and commands the antecedent, hence, by the precede-and-command restriction, the sentence should have been blocked. However, since the pronoun is in the VP, and, thus, does not c-command the antecedent (i.e., it is not in the c-command domain of the antecedent), the c-command restriction correctly permits coreference. The sentence in [(339)b], on the other hand, does not violate the requirement of precede-and-command (since the antecedent precedes the pronoun), but coreference is, nevertheless, blocked. This is precisely the prediction of the c-command restriction since the pronoun c-commands the antecedent, although the antecedent precedes."

A modification of c-command
(340)a *In Ben's picture of Rosa, she found a scratch

(341)a *I met him in Ben's office

(342) "The definition of c-command should ... be modified so that in the situation of the type of \( \alpha \) over \( \alpha \), the higher \( \alpha \) node should be considered as determining c-command relation."

p.148

(343) Modified c-command

Node A c-commands node B iff the first branching node \( \alpha_1 \) dominating A either dominates B or is immediately dominated by a node \( \alpha_2 \) which dominates B and \( \alpha_2 \) is of the same category type as \( \alpha_1 \).

<Note the family resemblance to the category 'segmentation' of May (1985).>

**Chomsky (1980) On Binding**

Chomsky (1980) presents the first major revision towards modern Binding Theory. The notions 'bound' and 'free' are introduced, with their still standard definitions, as in (344)a,b:
An anaphor $\alpha$ is bound in $\beta$ if there is a category c-commanding it and co-indexed with it in $\beta$.

b. Otherwise, $\alpha$ is free in $\beta$.

c. $X$ c-commands $Y$ if every (branching) category dominating $X$ also dominates $Y$.

The SSC and TSC (actually renamed P(ositional) I(s1and) C(ondition) in Chomsky (1976)), are restated initially as (345):

(345) If $\alpha$ is an anaphor in the domain of the tense or the subject of $\beta$, $\beta$ minimal, then $\alpha$ cannot be free in $\beta$, $\beta = \text{NP or S'}$.

(346) "The Opacity Condition as given here differs in several important respects from earlier formulations of the PIC and SSC. First, it is given as a condition on LF ... rather than as a condition on some collection of rules of grammar, including transformations, Control, Bound Anaphora, etc. Second, the Opacity Condition is not given as a "constraint on variables" relating two positions involved in some rule, but rather as a condition on the anaphor. Third, it is now unnecessary to introduce the notion "specified" in the analogue to the SSC. In [(348)], the reciprocal phrase is coindexed with PRO, and is therefore not free in S." p.12

(348) I told them [s what PRO to give each other t]

(349) "This simplification overcomes a problem for the SSC noted by Lasnik."

(350) which men did Tom think that Bill believed t saw each other

(351) "Here t is the trace of which men, but if the Reciprocal rule associates which men and each other, it should be blocked by the SSC, since the specified subject Bill intervenes."

Elimination of 'redundancy' in the conditions

(352) *They told me [what I gave each other]

(353) "The structure [(352)] is blocked by the PIC, since each other is free in the domain of Tense, but also by the SSC, since it is free in the domain of the subject I. It has often proven a useful strategy to try to eliminate redundancies of this sort. We might do so in the present case by restricting the PIC to the subject of a tensed clause." p.13

Hence, Chomsky proposed the Nominative Island Condition, a narrower version of PIC/TSC involving only subjects of finite clauses.

(354) A nominative anaphor cannot be free in S' containing S.

-45-
Further, a longstanding empirical problem is purportedly solved:

(355)  They expected [that [[pictures of each other] would be on sale]]

TSC/PIC incorrectly excluded such an example, as each other does not have a binder inside the minimal finite clause containing it. But since each other is not nominative here, (354) allows the example. On the other hand, this is a classic instance of a position of lack of complementarity between anaphors and bound pronouns, so there is always at least half of a problem:

(356)  They expected that pictures of them would be on sale

Further, there is a bit of residual redundancy:

(357)  *The men think [that Mary said [that each other would win]]

The status of wh-trace

Based on an argument of Rizzi (1980), Chomsky suggests that a wh-trace is not an anaphor for Opacity, not just in Italian (as suggested by Rizzi), but in English, as well, the locality constraints on Wh-Movement given by Subjacency instead for the relevant cases. This now partially unifies the treatment of wh trace, given the argument from strong crossover, discussed above, that wh-trace has the behavior of a name. Surprisingly, though, Chomsky explicitly limits the suggestion that Wh trace is not an anaphor to Opacity (SSC) effects, and not to NIC effects. Thus, he proposes that the difference between the mildly ungrammatical Subjacency violation (358)a and the completely impossible (358)b is to be attributed to the fact that NIC as well as Subjacency is violated in the latter.

(358) a  ?What1 [, did you wonder [, who2 [, t2 saw t1]]]
               b  *Who1 [, did you wonder [, what2 [, t2 saw t1]]]

Taraldsen (1978), Pesetsky (1981), and Kayne (1980) present analyses along similar lines. But Freidin and Lasnik (1981) argue against any such treatment, based on strong crossover phenomena. It is true that the standard examples of crossover, such as those presented in Chomsky (1976), all involved object NPs (hence, were not inconsistent with the proposal that a nominative wh-trace is an anaphor). However, alongside the strong crossover examples presented by Chomsky, there are also examples where the trace is nominative. And contrary to what might be expected, such examples are no better than (358)b on the relevant interpretation:

(359)  *Who1 did he1 say t1 kissed Mary?

Thus, wh-trace doesn't behave like an anaphor in NIC contexts any more than in SSC/Opacity contexts.
The OB technology

Index assignment:
(360)a First, movement involves obligatory co-indexing of moved category and its trace.

b Then, the remaining NPs in a sentence are indexed in 'top to bottom' fashion: an index is
assigned to NP only when all NPs that c-command it or dominate it have been indexed.

For anaphors, Chomsky proposes that 'referential indices' are assigned by 'rules of construal'
guaranteeing co-indexation with an antecedent. This introduces substantial redundancy into the
system, since anaphors that are not bound in the appropriate local domain will be excluded
regardless. To the extent that all relevant phenomena can be described in these terms, we will
have a strong argument for free indexing instead.

A referential index is an integer. Nonanaphors are also assigned referential indices, though not,
of course, by the same algorithm as in the case of anaphors. As before, the algorithm operates
top down. But this time, contra-indexing, rather than co-indexing, is what is forced. Each
nonanaphoric NP that has not already received an index (by movement) is assigned an unused
integer as its referential index. (In this case, as well, the stipulation that the index be a new one is
ultimately unnecessary.) In addition to its referential index (an integer), each nonanaphor is also
assigned what Chomsky calls an 'anaphoric index'.

(361) The anaphoric index of an NP is the set consisting of every integer that is the referential
index of any NP c-commanding the NP in question. The (complete) index of a
nonanaphor will be a pair (r, A) where

r

is the referential index and

A

is the anaphoric index.

(362) John_{(2, {})} told Bill_{(3, {2})} about him_{(4, {2,3})}

(363) "We will interpret the anaphoric index A = \{a_1, \ldots, a_n\} of \alpha to mean that \alpha is disjoint in
reference from each NP with referential index a_i. Thus, him in [(362)] is disjoint in
reference from John and Bill, and if John were to replace him (or Bill) in [(362)], the two
occurrences of John would be disjoint in reference. Of course, "disjoint reference" in this
context has to do with intended reference; actual reference is outside the scope of
grammar. On coreference of lexical and pronominal NPs, see Lasnik (1976)."

p.39

Notice that these indexing principles combined with this interpretive principle give the effects of
both RI of Chomsky (1973) and the disjoint reference rule of Lasnik (1976). There is a
conceptual difference, however. While the earlier analyses combined the syntactic and semantic
aspects of disjoint reference into one rule, the proposal now under discussion modularly
separates the two aspects. There are syntactic rules and well-formedness conditions determining
what syntactic representations are allowed. Then there is an interpretive principle assigning a
meaning to a syntactically well-formed structure.

-47-
The present analysis is not yet complete. It does correctly rule out all cases of overlap in reference discussed in Lasnik (1976). Further, it rules out all cases covered by RI. But it does not yet capture the fact that RI showed TSC and SSC effects. Thus, it incorrectly excludes a co-referential interpretation for John and he or him in (364):

(364)a John thinks he is clever
b John thinks Mary likes him

Chomsky proposes to capture this property and the corresponding property of anaphor binding simultaneously. Specifically, he first proposes that the binding conditions (now NIC and Opacity) can be construed as deleting certain indices from the anaphoric index of a pronoun, thus in effect blocking certain cases of disjoint reference and permitting reference to be free. For an NP with no anaphoric index (i.e., an anaphor) the binding conditions operate on the referential index, altering it in a certain way rather similar to the way in which the anaphoric index is altered in the case of a pronoun. The binding conditions will thus affect the 'designated index' of an NP, where the designated index of a pronoun is its anaphoric index, and the designated index of an anaphor is its referential index (which is, of course, its only index).

(365) Suppose that $α$ has the designated index $j$ and $i$ is an integer such that $i = j$ or $i \in j$. Then $α$ is free (i) in $β$ if there is no $γ$ in $β$ with index $i$ that c-commands $α$.  

(366) $[j - i] = (j - i) \text{ if } j \text{ is an integer and } \{j - \{i\}\} \text{ if } j \text{ is a set.}$

(367) Suppose that $α$ has the designated index $j$ and is free(i) in $β$ ($β = NP \text{ or } \overline{S}$), where (a) $α$ is nominative

or (b) $α$ is in the domain of the subject of $β$, $β$ minimal.

Then $j \rightarrow [j - i]$.  

(368) NP$_0$ is not permitted in LF, where 0 is the referential index. This is the case of an inadmissible free variable, an anaphor that is not properly bound. pp.40-41

Lectures on Government and Binding Chomsky (1981)

Chomsky begins by criticizing the On Binding theory of anaphora on several counts.

(369) The OB system treated PRO as an anaphor. This was too weak in that it didn't entail that PRO occurs only in ungoverned positions, and too strong in that 'long distance control' as in (370) would be incorrectly excluded by SSC.

(370) They thought I said [that [[PRO to feed each other] would be difficult]]

(371) In OB there is a sort of redundancy between the theories of Case and binding. They both pick out the subject of infinitives as special, but by totally different means.

(372) In OB the two configurations relevant to binding theory - subject of a finite clause and c-command domain of a subject - are in no way related.
The OB indexing conventions are complicated.

LGB approach

α is bound by β if and only if α and β are coindexed and β c-commands α.

α is free if and only if it is not bound.

A An anaphor is (A-)bound in its GC.
   B A pronominal is (A-)free in its GC.
   C An R-expression (fully lexical NP, or variable) is (A-) free.

α is a governing category for β if and only if α is the minimal category containing β, a governor of β, and a SUBJECT accessible to β.

SUBJECT = AGR in a finite clause; NP of S in an infinitival; NP of NP in an NP.

*John believes [(that) himself is clever]
  b *They believe [(that) each other are clever]
  c *Mary is believed [(that) t is clever]

John believes [himself to be clever]
  b They believe [each other to be clever]
  c Mary is believed [t to be clever]

*John believes [him to be clever]
  b John believes [(that) he is clever]

Mary believes [them to be clever]
  b *Mary believes [(that) them are clever]

Infinitivals (at least some of them) are not barriers to government, either for Case assignment (382) or for establishment of governing category (379)-(381).

*John believes [Mary to like himself]
(384) John believes [Mary to like him]
(385) *He believes [(that) John is clever]
(386) *He believes [Mary to like John]
(387) *He believes [Mary to like John]
(388) a *We heard [their stories about each other]
  b We heard [some stories about each other]
(389) Does (378) successfully address (372)? Chomsky suggests that it does, in that SUBJECT of α is the most prominent nominal element of α, taking INFL (which contains AGR) as the head of S. [But notice it cannot be the head of NP that counts as SUBJECT of NP, or (388)b will be ruled out alongside (388)a.]

(390) They₁ expected [that[[pictures of each other₁] would be on sale]]
(391) They₁ expected [that[[pictures of each other₁], AGR₂ would be on sale]]
(392) μ is accessible to β iff β is in the c-command domain of μ and assignment to β of the index of μ would not violate (393).
(393) *[γ,...δ...], where γ and δ bear the same index.
(394) i.e., μ is accessible to β iff β is in the c-command domain of μ and μ is not coindexed with any category properly containing β. [Kevin Kearney's formulation]
(395) *John₁ thinks [that [himself₁, AGR₁ will win]]
(396) They₁ think [it₂, AGR₂ is a pity [that pictures of each other₁, are hanging on the wall]]₂
(397) *They₁ think [it₂, AGR₂ bothered each other₁ [that S₂]]
(398) They₁ think [it₂, AGR₂ is a pity [that pictures of them₁, are hanging on the wall]]₂
(399) They₁ expected [that[[pictures of them₁], AGR₂ would be on sale]]
(400) Problematically, anaphors and bound pronouns are not in full complementary distribution. Another example:
(401)a They read [each other's books]
   b They read [their books]
(402) John tried [PRO to leave] <Complement of try is S', a barrier to government.>
(403)a *I like PRO
   b *Susan spoke to PRO
   c *John believes [PRO to be intelligent] <Complement of believe is S, not a barrier to government.>
   d *John's belief [PRO to be intelligent]
   e *John believes [PRO is intelligent]
(404) Proposal: PRO is a pronominal anaphor, hence, it must obey both (376)A and (376)B. That is, it must be both bound and free in its governing category. If it has a governing category, this is a contradiction, therefore it must have no GC. This (almost) entails that it must be ungoverned, the descriptive generalization covering (403). This deduction is standardly called the PRO theorem. It has the effect of permitting long distance control, by virtue of divorcing control from binding theory. See (369).
(405) "...PRO is like overt pronouns in that it never has an antecedent within its clause or NP. PRO also resembles anaphors in that it has no intrinsic referential content but is either assigned reference by an antecedent or is indefinite in interpretation, lacking specific reference."
This elegant deduction of the central distributional property of PRO clearly relies on the fact that the definition of GC makes reference to government. Is there independent justification for this aspect of the definition? Chomsky considers a simplification whereby GC is changed to 'binding category' as follows:

(409) $\beta$ is a binding category for $\alpha$ if and only if $\beta$ is the minimal category containing $\alpha$ and a SUBJECT accessible to $\alpha$.

(410) A An anaphor is bound in its binding category
B A pronominal is free in its binding category

(411) This modification has "no effects for elements that are governed since for such elements the governor will always be contained in the binding category." p.220

(412) John$_1$ believed [him$_1$ to be the winner]

Here the binding category for him is the entire sentence, since in the embedded clause there is no SUBJECT accessible to him. The mention of government is actually only significant for PRO. The PRO Theorem is, then, more like the PRO Principle.

The modular character of the theory

(413) (376) A-C are purely syntactic: they filter out structures based solely on their formal properties. Do we need any associated semantics?

(414) "John likes him" can't mean that John likes himself.
(415) *John$_1$ likes him$_1$
(416) John$_1$ likes him$_2$

(417) If two NP's have distinct indices then...
(418) They like him
(419) ...then they are disjoint in reference.

(420) *We$_1$ like myself$_2$
(421) ¬We$_1$ like myself$_1$ <Just a failure of agreement? No: "They like themselves" demands coreference.>

(422) If two NPs have identical indices, then they are coreferential.
(423) We think [I, will win]

(424) The problem is that NP's have at least three referential relations: disjointness; identity; overlap. But two numerical subscripts are either identical or distinct. See (373). (423) is the cost of addressing (373) in the way that LGB does, as discussed in Lasnik (1981).

A problem with expletives

(425) An expletive and its associated argument must be coindexed to establish the appropriate Case and agreement relation. But such a structure seems to violate Condition C:

(426) There is a man in the room
(427) There is a man in the room
(428) Binding theory cares only about subscripts.

Binding conditions at S-structure

(429) [Which book that John read] did he, like t_j
(430) *He, liked [every book that John, read]
(431) *Who thinks that he, read [which book that John, likes]

QR and LF wh-movement would incorrectly neutralize the Condition C difference between these examples.

(432) "...these examples provide prima facie evidence that the binding theory applies at S-structure, a conclusion that I will now adopt." p.197

Barss (1986) draws the same conclusion for Condition A, based on examples like the following:

(433)a John wonders [[which picture of himself] [Mary showed to Susan]]
(433)b *John wonders [who [ showed which picture of himself, to Susan]]

(433)a shows that an anaphor within the embedded CP Spec can be licensed by an antecedent in the matrix subject position. Given this fact, the ungrammaticality of (433)b is surprising if anaphors can be licensed by virtue of their LF positions. (On the then standard theory, in LF, WH-phrase in situ, which picture of himself, moves to the embedded CP Spec position, where it takes scope. Thus, at LF, the configurational relation between himself and its antecedent is virtually identical in (433)a and (433)b. Hence, the ungrammaticality of (433)b shows that anaphors must be licensed at a level prior to LF, e.g., S-structure (and possibly at LF as well).

Knowledge of Language Chomsky (1986)

An alternative account of existential constructions, based on 'expletive replacement' driven by Full Interpretation:

(434) A man, is t, in the room [where t is an A-movement trace, hence not a variable].
(435) Binding theory applies at LF, and not at S-structure. [But cf. (431) and (433). Sorting
out this apparent contradiction became one of the major goals of minimalist theorizing about anaphora.]

den Dikken (1995) shows that Chomsky can't be correct even for existential constructions:

(436) *There seem to each other, to be some applicants, eligible for the job

An account of non-complementarity between anaphors and bound pronouns

(437)a They, read [each other's, books]
   b They, read [their, books]

Following Huang (1983), Chomsky proposed to eliminate the total complementarity between anaphors and pronouns:

(438) "...the relevant local domain is different in some respect for anaphors and pronominals ... this difference should fall out as an immediate consequence of the difference in their nature - namely, that anaphors must be bound whereas pronominals must be free - without any need to stipulate any further difference in the binding theory conditions for these two categories of expressions."  p.170

(439) The following definitions and licensing conditions concern an expression E with indexing I. The indexing I and a pair (α,β) are compatible with respect to the binding theory if α satisfies the binding theory in the local domain β under the indexing I. A 'complete functional complex' (CFC) is a projection of a head including all grammatical functions compatible with that head.

(440) I is BT-compatible with (α,β) if:
   (A) α is an anaphor and is bound in β under I
   (B) α is a pronominal and is free in β under I
   (C) α is an r-expression and is free in β under I

(441) Licensing condition for a category α governed by a lexical category γ in the expression E with indexing I:
   For some β such that (i) or (ii), I is BT-compatible with (α,β):
   (i) α is an r-expression and (a) if α heads its chain or (b) otherwise
      (a) β = E
      (b) β is the domain of the head of the chain of α
   (ii) α is an anaphor or pronominal and β is the least CFC containing γ for which there is an indexing J BT-compatible with (α,β)

(442) "...for α an anaphor or pronominal ... the licensing condition amounts to saying that the relevant governing category for α is the minimal one in which binding theory could have been satisfied under some indexing."  p.172

(443) "... if α has no governor, then the licensing condition [(441)] is inapplicable."  p.172
This allows PRO in ungoverned positions. What blocks it from governed positions with a small GC for its pronominal aspect and a larger one for its anaphoric aspect?

(444) "If PRO is governed, then it is subject to the licensing condition (441). But this condition can never be satisfied, because whatever the indexing $I$, there can be no $\beta$ such that $I$ is $BT$-compatible with (PRO, $\beta$); as an anaphor, PRO would have to be bound in $\beta$ under $I$, and as a pronominal it would have to be free in $\beta$ under $I$. Therefore, PRO cannot be governed." p.183

(445) The major instances of non-complementarity are now accommodated. But there is an apparent cost: we have lost the TSC/NIC:

(446)a *John$_i$ believes [(that) himself$_i$ is clever]
b *They$_i$ believe [(that) each other$_i$ are clever]

(447) Chomsky's solution to this problem takes us full circle, all the way back to Chomsky (1973): the constraint on anaphora here should reduce to a constraint on movement (rather than vice versa). Chomsky suggests that the movement constraint (the ECP) at work in (448) is also relevant in (446) assuming that in LF, anaphors undergo movement to be in some appropriate very local relation with their antecedents.

(448) *Mary$_i$ is believed [(that) t$_i$ is clever]

Note that this approach has the desirable effect of reducing some of the 'redundancy' in the treatment of (448). Given that it already violates ECP and the 'last resort' condition on A-movement, we would like it not to also violate Condition A.

**Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) Towards a minimalist theory**

A reanalysis of the distribution of PRO

A problem with the LGB treatment: argument PRO appears in non-Case-positions, necessitating a disjunctive version of the Visibility Condition:

(449) A chain is visible for $\theta$-marking if it contains a Case-position (necessarily, its head) or is headed by PRO

A new generalization: Like other arguments, PRO is not permitted to move from a Case-marked position, even to escape government:

(450) (i) $\alpha$ to talk about $\beta$
(ii) $\alpha$ to strike $\beta$ [that the problems are insoluble]
(iii) $\alpha$ to seem to $\beta$ [that the problems are insoluble]

Suppose that (i) is a D-structure in the context "it is unfair --," with $\alpha = e$ and $\beta = John$. The last
resort condition bars raising of \( \beta \) to position \( \alpha \), yielding (451)i, because \( \textit{John} \) is already visible for \( \theta \)-marking without movement. Suppose \( \beta = \text{PRO} \). On the assumptions now under consideration, PRO must raise to the position \( \alpha \) to satisfy the nongovernment requirement. But that movement is impermissible, even though \( \alpha \) is a legitimate position for PRO in other constructions, as in (451)iii:

(451) (i) *it is unfair [\textit{John} to talk about \( t \)]  
(ii) *it is unfair [\text{PRO} to talk about \( t \)]  
(iii) it is unfair [\text{PRO} to talk about \textit{John}]  

(452) (i) It is rare for it to strike \textit{John} [that the problems are insoluble]  
(ii) It is rare for it to seem to \textit{John} [that the problems are insoluble]

(453) (i) *We want \textit{John} to strike \( t \) [that the problems are insoluble]  
(ii) *We want \text{PRO} to seem to \( t \) [that the problems are insoluble]

(454) (i) *We want \text{PRO} to strike \( t \) [that the problems are insoluble]  
(ii) *We want \text{PRO} to seem to \( t \) [that the problems are insoluble]  

<cf. (iii) *We want it to seem to \text{PRO} [that the problems are insoluble]>

PRO is now in an ungoverned position, heading a \( \theta \)-marked chain. Hence all conditions are satisfied. But the constructions are radically ungrammatical, whatever the context.

Some principle requires that PRO behave like other arguments, moving from non-Case-positions and barred from moving from Case-positions. Suppose then PRO, like other arguments, has Case, but (at least sometimes) a Case different from the familiar ones: nominative, accusative, etc. From the point of view of interpretation, we might regard PRO as a "minimal" NP argument, lacking independent phonetic, referential or other properties. Accordingly, let us say that it is the sole NP that can bear null Case (though it may have other Cases as well, in nonstandard conditions that we will not review here).

It follows that the last resort principle applies to PRO exactly as it does to any argument: PRO is permitted to move from a non-Case-position to a position where its Case can be assigned or checked, and is not permitted to move from a Case-position. The Visibility Condition can now be simplified to (455):

(455) A chain is visible for \( \theta \)-marking if it contains a Case-position

Where, then, is null Case checked? Nominative Case is standardly checked in [SPEC, IP], where I involves the features of tense and agreement (T, AGR). It is thus a realization of a SPEC-head relation, with the head = INFL, the head of IP. It is natural, then, to take null Case to be a realization of the same relation where INFL lacks tense and agreement features: the minimal INFL checks null Case, and the minimal NP alone can bear it. More generally, we may assume that the infinitival element (with null agreement) and the head ING of gerundive nominals check null Case, so that PRO will appear in such constructions as:

(456)(i) \text{PRO} to VP (to be sick)  
(ii) \text{PRO} ING VP (being sick)
Binding Theory without indices?

(457) (i) If $\alpha$ is an anaphor, interpret it as coreferential with a c-commanding phrase in D
(ii) If $\alpha$ is a pronoun, interpret it as disjoint from every c-commanding phrase in D.
(iii) If $\alpha$ is an r-expression, interpret it as disjoint from every c-commanding phrase.

(457)ii is very reminiscent of RI of Chomsky (1973). And (457)iii is similarly reminiscent of the disjoint reference rule of Lasnik (1976).

Reconstruction

(458) Which picture of himself does John like

Riemsdijk and Williams (1981) propose that Condition A is satisfied at NP-structure, a level of representation following all A-movement and preceding all A'-movement

(459) $[[\text{which pictures of himself}_{i}] \text{ did John}_{i} \text{ think } [t' [\text{ Fred}_{j} \text{ liked } t] ]]$ Barss (1986)

As Barss notes, when the antecedent is John, the NP-structure account fails (as would a deep structure interpretive procedure).

There are several pieces of machinery that would work:

(460) Barss's proposal that all parts of a chain are accessible for determination of Condition A satisfaction.
(461) The Belletti and Rizzi (1988) idea that Condition A can be satisfied anywhere in the course of the derivation.
(462) The copy theory of movement, under which traces are all copies of the moved item. Chomsky (1993) already considered, but rejected, in Chomsky (1981, p.89)


(463) Arguments, of increasing strength, against an S-Structure condition:
(464)a The condition can apply at LF alone.
   b Furthermore, the condition sometimes must apply at LF.
   c Furthermore, the condition must not apply at S-Structure.
     Chomsky, p. 192

(465)a John$_i$ wondered $[[\text{which picture of himself}_{1/2}] [\text{Bill}_{2} \text{ saw } t]]$
b John$_i$ wondered $[\text{who}_{2} [t \text{ saw } [\text{which picture of himself}_{1/2}]]]$
(466)a The students$_i$ asked $[[\text{what attitudes about each other}_{1/2}] [\text{the teachers}_{2} \text{ had noticed } t]]$
b The students$_i$ asked $[\text{who}_{2} [t \text{ had noticed } \text{ [what attitudes about each other}_{1/2}]]]$ p.205

(467) The bad readings of (465)b and (466)b are ruled out at LF, under the assumption that LF movement is not of the entire wh-phrase. Then no appeal to S-Structure is required.
(468) The readings of all the examples implicate the 'copy theory of movement'.

(469) John wondered [[\( \text{wh which picture of himself} \)][Bill saw [[\( \text{wh which picture of himself} \)]]]

(470) Then, by an LF "operation akin to QR" we have (471) or (472), depending on the size of the QRed item.

(471) John wondered [[[[\( \text{wh which picture of himself} \)][\( \text{wh t} \)][Bill saw [[\( \text{wh which picture of himself} \)[\( \text{wh t} \)]]]]]

(472) John wondered [[[[\( \text{which \( \text{wh t} \) picture of himself} \)][Bill saw [which [[\( \text{wh t} \) picture of himself]]]]]

(473) With complementary deletion to produce an operator variable structure, we have:

(474) John wondered [[[[\( \text{wh which picture of himself} \)][\( \text{wh t} \)][Bill saw [[\( \text{wh which picture of himself} \)[\( \text{wh t} \)]]]]]

(475) John wondered [[[[\( \text{which \( x, x \) a picture of himself} \)][Bill saw \( x \)]]]

(476) John wondered [[[[\( \text{which \( x, x \) a picture of himself} \)][Bill saw [which [[\( \text{wh t} \) picture of himself]]]]]

(477) John wondered [[[[\( \text{which \( x, x \) a picture of himself} \)][Bill saw \( x \) picture of himself]]]]

(478) a In (474), John is the antecedent of himself.
    b In (476), Bill is the antecedent of himself.  p.206

(479) John wondered [[[[\( \text{which picture of himself} \)][Bill took \( t \)]]]

(480) Himself in (479) can take John or Bill as antecedent, just as in the earlier examples, BUT only when took means 'pick up and walk away with'.

(481) When took (pictures) means 'photograph' (the 'idiomatic reading'), Himself can only take Bill as antecedent, according to Chomsky.

(482) a John wondered [[[[\( \text{which \( x, x \) a picture of himself} \)][Bill took \( x \)]]]
    b John wondered [[[[\( \text{which \( x, x \) a picture of himself} \)][Bill took \( x \) picture of himself]]]]

(483) "Having abandoned D-Structure, we must assume that idiom interpretation takes place at LF ..."  p.207

(484) "Thus, take ... picture can be interpreted as 'photograph' only if the phrase is present as a unit at LF - that is, in (482)b, but not (482)a."

(485) This explains why in (482)a we can only have the nonidiomatic interpretation of take.

(486) The students, asked [[[[what attitudes about each other, \( \text{the teachers, had t} \)]]]

(487) Chomsky gives a parallel analysis here: have ... attitudes is a sort of idiom, so must be unified at LF.
(488) "The conclusions follow on the crucial assumption that Condition A not apply at S-Structure... If Condition A were to apply at S-Structure, John could be taken as antecedent of himself in [(479)] and the later LF processes would be free to choose either the idiomatic or the literal interpretation, however the reconstruction phenomena are handled ..."

(489) "Thus, we have the strongest kind of argument against an S-Structure condition ... Condition A cannot apply at S-Structure."

(490) But there is now a near contradiction with Chomsky's account of the Freidin-Lebeaux Condition C examples (to be discussed below), as Chomsky observes (p.208).

(491a) John1 wondered [which picture of himself1/2][Bill2 saw t]

b John1 wondered [which picture of Tom2][he1/*2 liked t]

(492) In (491), the of phrase, being a complement, must reconstruct. This gives the right result for (491)b but not for (491)a.

(493) The 2 reading of (491)b is ruled out by the preference principle that Chomsky proposes for the Freidin-Lebeaux cases:

(494) "... try to minimize the restriction in the operator position ..."

(495) Why "minimize the restriction"? Why not "maximize the restriction"? A speculation: When you minimize the restriction, you have QRd a smaller (and proper subpart) of what you would QR to maximize the restriction. Moving less is more economical than moving more (like the deduction of Procrastinate from economy).

(496) To allow the 1 reading of (491)a, we need it to be true that something makes the normally disfavored option necessary.

(497) That something is the LF cliticization approach to anaphora:

(498a) John self-wondered [which picture of \(t_{\text{self}}\)][NP saw [which picture of himself]]

b John wondered [which picture of himself][NP self-saw [which picture of \(t_{\text{self}}\)]]

(499a) \([\text{which picture of } \alpha] \ t \)  \(\alpha = t_{\text{self}} \text{ or } \text{himself}\)

b \([\text{which}]\text{[t picture of } \alpha] \)

(500) If we select the syntactic option (498)a then we cannot select the interpretive option (499)b (with \(\alpha = t_{\text{self}}\)).

(501) That option requires deletion of \([t \text{ picture of } t_{\text{self}}]\) in the operator position, which would break the chain \((\text{self}, t_{\text{self}})\), leaving the reflexive without a \(\theta\)-role at LF.

(502) In short, if we take the antecedent of the reflexive to be John, then only the nonreconstructing option converges.
(503) several pictures were taken

(504) the students asked [which pictures of each other] [\(t'\) were taken \(t\) by Mary]

(505) "One possibility is that the trace of the A-chain enters into the idiom interpretation (and, generally, into \(\theta\)-marking), while the head of the chain functions in the usual way with regard to scope and other matters." p.211

(506) the claim that John was asleep seems to him \([ip \ t\ to\ be\ correct]\)

(507) "... if "reconstruction" is essentially a reflex of operator-variable constructions, it will hold only for \(\bar{A}\)-chains, not for A-chains." p.205

Condition C reconstruction

I. Condition C Complement/Adjunct Reconstruction Asymmetries (The 'Freidin-Lebeaux Effect')

(508)a Which report that John, revised did he, submit?
   b *Which report that John, was incompetent did he, submit?
      Freidin (1986)

(509) a *He, believes the claim that John, is nice.
   b *He, likes the story that John, wrote.
   c *Whose claim that John, is nice did he, believe?
   d Which story that John, wrote did he, like?
      Lebeaux (1988)

(510)a *Which claim that John, was asleep did he, later deny
   b Which claim that John, made did he, later deny
      Munn (1994)

(511)a *Which claim [that John, was asleep] was he, willing to discuss
   b Which claim [that John, made] was he, willing to discuss

(512)a *The claim that John, is [sic] asleep, he, was willing to discuss
   b The claim that John, made, he, was willing to discuss
      Chomsky (1993)

(513)a *The claim that John, was asleep, he, won't discuss
   b The claim that John, made, he, won't discuss
      Chomsky and Lasnik (1993)

(514) The claim that John, was asleep seems to him, [ip \(t\) to be correct]
      Chomsky (1993)

(515) *I seem to him, [\(t\) to like John,]

(516)a The 'Extension Condition': structure must be built strictly cyclically.
   b Adjuncts are exempt from the Extension Condition; relative clauses are adjuncts.
   c "Reconstruction" is essentially a reflex of the formation of operator-variable constructions.
d An operator chain (a sequence of copies) undergoes complementary deletion.

(517)a [[Which claim][that John made]] was he willing to discuss \textit{which claim} \quad \text{PF}
b The widespread belief that John is incompetent, he deeply resents

(518)a Which claim \textit{that John made} was he willing to discuss \textit{which claim} \quad \text{PF}
b For which x, x a claim that John made, he was willing to discuss x \textit{claim} \quad \text{Interpretation (?)}

(519)a Which claim \textit{that John was asleep} was he willing to discuss \textit{which claim that John was asleep} \quad \text{PF}
b For which x, x a claim that John was asleep, he was willing to discuss x \textit{claim that John was asleep} \quad \text{Interpretation (?)}

(520)a Which claim \textit{that John was asleep} was he willing to discuss \textit{which claim that John was asleep} \quad \text{PF}
b For which x that John was asleep, he was willing to discuss x \textit{claim that John was asleep} \quad \text{Interpretation (?)}

(521)a Which claim \textit{that John was asleep} was he willing to discuss \textit{which claim that John was asleep} \quad \text{PF}
b For which x, x a claim that John was asleep, he was willing to discuss x \textit{claim that John was asleep} \quad \text{Interpretation (?)}

BUT CRUICALLY NOT

(522) "...preference principle for reconstruction: Do it when you can (i.e., try to minimize the restriction in the operator position)."

(523) Which piece of evidence that John was guilty did he successfully refute?

II. Concerns About the Generalization \hfill Lasnik (1998)

(524) The widespread belief that John is incompetent, he deeply resents

(525) Whose argument that John was incorrect did you show him?

(526) How many arguments that John's theory was correct did he publish?

(527) This argument that John's theory is correct, he is now ready to publish.

(528) Which proof that Mary's theory is superior to John's did she present?

(529) Mary's attempt to hire John's student, he heartily endorsed.

(530) John's request to attend Mary's lecture, she immediately granted.
(531)a  The claim that the director was corrupt, he was unwilling to discuss  
b  That the director was corrupt, everyone knew that he would always be able to deny with a straight face  
Postal (1997)

(532)a  Whose allegation that John was less than truthful did he refute vehemently?  
b  Whose claim that the Senator had violated the campaign finance regulations did he dismiss as politically motivated?  
Kuno (1997)

(533)a  *Which claim that John was asleep did he later deny  
b  Which claim that John made did he later deny  
Munn (1994)

(534)  Later than what, one might ask?

(535)  *Whose claim that John is nice did he believe?  
(536)  Susan: John is nice.  
        Mary: John is nice.  
        !John: I believe Susan but I don't believe Mary.  
Lebeaux (1988)

(537)  Lydia Grebenyova's experiment (with UMD undergrads, 2004):  
(538)  Two claims have been made about John's arrest: that John was arrested yesterday and that John was arrested a week ago. John has a lawyer, whose name is Bill  
(539)  Which specific claim that John had been arrested did Bill deny  
(540)  Which specific claim that he had been arrested did John deny  
(541)  Which specific claim that John had been arrested did he deny  
(542)  6 of 7 subjects accepted both (540) and (541) on the coreferential reading.

(543)  What if the complement/relative asymmetry with WH-movement is illusory. How problematic is that for the theory?  
(544)a  (516)a vs. b is arguably just a stipulation, as is (516)c.  
b  The status of (522) is unclear.  
(545)  If anything, then, lack of that asymmetry might be a 'better' state of affairs. (The only mildly negative consequence, depending on your point of view, is that a potential argument for traces, i.e., copies, disappears.)

References


